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DESCRIPTIVE SUMMARY 
The following Memorandum is submitted in opposition to the United States' and 
Coeur d'Alene Tribe's Joint Motion for Summary Judgment in Consolidated Subcase 91-
77 55, addressing the reserved water right claims made by the United States as trustee on 
behalf of the Coeur d'Alene Tribe. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
The United States and the Coeur d'Alene Tribe filed a joint separate motion for 
summary judgment in Consolidated Subcase 91-77 55, which addresses 353 claims to federal 
reserved water rights on lands and waterways within the Coeur d'Alene Indian Reservation 
and on numerous waterways outside the Reservation. Concurrently, the State of Idaho filed 
its own motion for summary judgment. This memorandum, filed in response to the 
summary judgment motions of both the United States and the Tribe, incorporates by 
reference the points and authorities submitted in the State of Idaho's Memorandum in 
Support of Motion for Summary Judgment. 
II. STATEMENT OF UNDISPUTED FACTS 
The States has submitted separately the State of Idaho's Statement of Additional 
Facts. Except as explicitly pointed out therein and herein, the State, solely for purposes of 
these summary judgment motions, does not dispute the facts as set out in the United States' 
and Coeur d'Alene Tribe's Joint Statement of Facts. 1 
Ill. SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Claimants United States and Coeur d'Alene Tribe ("Tribe") base their water right 
claims exclusively on the 1873 Executive Order and its alleged "homeland" purposes. In 
doing so, they err, because Congress explicitly rejected the Reservation set forth in the 
Executive Order. Rather than ratify the reservation, Congress sought, and obtained, a 
substantial cession of the waterways, timberlands, and other natural resources that provided 
1 The State reserves the right to contest the facts asserted by the United States and the 
Tribe, and to impeach the statements and opinions offered by their expert witnesses, if this matter 
proceeds to trial. 
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the Tribe's traditional subsistence needs. See Smith 2015 Report at 2 (the Tribe's seasonal 
cycles of hunting, fishing, and gathering ... relied heavily on the numerous rivers, lakes, 
springs, marshes, and other aquatic resources situated within the 1873 reservation 
boundaries"). 2 See also United States v. Idaho, 210 F.3d 1067, 1071 (9th Cir. 2000) ("the Tribe 
agreed to cede the approximate northern third of its 1873 reservation to the United States; 
this area included roughly the northern two-thirds of the Lake"). 
When Congress approved the new and substantially reduced Reservation in 1891, its 
act superseded the earlier executive order so that such order was "no longer of any force." 
British-American Otl Producing Co. v. Bd. of Equalization, 299 U.S. 162-63 (1936). Thus, any 
water rights implied by the reservation ofland must, as a matter oflaw, be implied from the 
later congressional action, i.e., the Act of March 3, 1891, 26 Stat. 989, 1031. Indeed, in 
Winters v. United States, 207 U.S. 564 (1908), the Court implied water rights solely on the basis 
of a Congressional act that approved a substantially reduced reservation within the bounds 
of an earlier, larger reservation. 
By the time Congress acted to establish the permanent Reservation, the Tribe was 
famously known for its agricultural successes. In the Tribe's own words, its farmlands 
provided "whatever we are in need of." Exhibit 25 to Third Affidavit of Steven W. Strack 
(hereinafter "3d Strack Aff."). The Reservation's focus on agriculture was stated explicitly in 
the 1891 Act, which directed federal efforts to securing the "progress, comfort, 
improvement, education, and civilization of said Coeur d'Alene Indians." Act of March 3, 
1891, 26 Stat. at 1028 and 1031. The focus on reserving the lands and resources necessary to 
support the Tribe's agricultural endeavors is further demonstrated by Congress' directive 
that the reduced Reservation should be drawn to include the Tribe's farmlands, by the 
2 The Smith 2015 Report was filed with the Court as Exhibit 1 to the Affidavit of Ian Smith. 
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Tribe's cession of over 80% of Coeur d'Alene Lake and all of the Coeur d'Alene River, by 
the lack of any reservation of hunting or fishing rights in the agreements with the Tribe, and 
by the lack of any mention of the need for traditional subsistence resources in the 
negotiations leading up to the agreements. A later session of Congress confinned its 
understanding of the Reservation's agricultural focus when it ordered, in 1906, that the 
Tribe's land base be allotted and reduced to the fannlands that the Tribe continued to farm 
with great success, without any reservation of hunting or fishing rights on the Reservation 
lands that were opened to homesteading. Act of June 21, 1906, 34 Stat. 325,335. 
The only conclusion to be drawn from the plain terms of the agreements that were 
approved in the 1891 Act, and the legal and subsequent history of such agreements, is that 
support for traditional hunting, fishing and gathering was not a primary purpose of the 
Reservation, even though the Reservation retained the lower St.Joe River and a portion of 
Coeur d'Alene Lake. Thus, while the State does not contest that water may have been 
reserved where necessary for irrigation, domestic and municipal use, and some limited 
commercial or industrial uses, the State opposes the United States' claims for lake level, 
instream flows, wetlands, and springs water rights to support traditional subsistence 
practices. Tribal members continued to hunt and fish when not farming (as did their white 
neighbors, see State of Idaho's Statement of Additional Facts ,i 46), but the right to continued 
reliance on traditional subsistence practices was not specifically or separately reserved. 
Indian reserved water rights for hunting and fishing have been decreed when the tribe and 
the United States agreed to reserve a separate and exclusive fishing right for the Tribe. See, 
e.g., United States v. Adair, 723 F.2d 1394, 1409 (9th Cir. 1983) (treaty language reserving 
"exclusive" fishing right established that a primary purpose of the reservation "was to secure 
to the Tribe a continuation of its traditional hunting and fishing lifestyle"). Given the 
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complete lack of language expressly establishing that "continuation" of a hunting and fishing 
lifestyle was a purpose of the Reservation, the Court should deny the United States' claim of 
water rights to maintain wetlands, springs, lake level maintenance, and instream flows at 
levels existing before opening and development oflands in the Coeur d'Alene-Spokane 
River Basin .. 
IV. ARGUMENT 
A. THE COURT SHOULD REJECT THE UNITED STATES' ASSERTION THAT WATER 
WAS RESERVED FOR ALL "HOMELAND" PURPOSES. 
1. When Implying the Reservation of Water Rights, Canons of Construction 
Requiring that Ambiguities Be Resolved in Favor of Indian Tribes Do Not 
Override Precedent Requiring a Searching Examination of the Very 
Purposes of the Reservation. 
When interpreting a treaty or agreement with an Indian tribe, the primary task before 
the Court is to determine not only what the Tribe intended, but what both parties intended, 
because a "treaty represents a meeting of the minds culminating with an agreement akin to a 
contract." Saginaw Chippewa Indian Tribe of Michigan v. Granholm, No. 05-10296-BC, 2009 WL 
1285846, at 6 (E.D. Mich. Apr. 29, 2009). As this Court has previously stated, interpretation 
of treaties or agreements is a question of law: "examination of a treaty's negotiating history 
and purpose does not render its interpretation a matter of fact, but merely serves as an aid to 
the legal interpretation which is at the heart of all treaty interpretation."3 Thus, to imply the 
3 SRBA Consolidated Subcase 03-10022, Order on Motion to Strike Testimony of Dennis C. Colson; 
Order on United States' and Nez Perce Tribe's Joint Motion to Supplement the Record in Response to the Objectors' 
Motions For Summary Judgement, I.R C.P. 56 (!); Order on Motion to Strike Exhibit Transcription of Letter From 
General Palmer to George Manypenny, Commissioner Of Indian Affairs; Order on Motionsfar Summary Judgment 
of the State of Idaho, Idaho Power, Potlatch Corporation, Irrigation Districts, and Other Objectors Who Have Joined 
and/ or Supported the Various Motions, at 29 (SRBA Dist. Ct., Nov. 10, 1999). Hereinafter cited as 
"SRBA 03-10022 Summary Judgment Order." 
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reservation of a water right, the Court must be satisfied, as a question of law, that the Tribe 
and the United States reached agreement regarding the purposes of the Reservation. 
In determining whether a meeting of the minds occurred, the Court, as the United 
States suggests, must resolve ambiguities and "doubtful expressions" in favor of the Tribe. 
Choctaw Nation v. Oklahoma, 397 U.S. 620,631 (1970). But there is a distinct difference 
between "doubtful expressions" and "doubts." In Northwestern Bands of Shoshone Indians v. 
United States, 324 U.S. 335 (1945), the Court specifically rejected the tribe's assertion that 
"[a]ll doubts ... must be resolved in their (the Indians') favor." Id. at 353. The court stated 
that the canon of construction prohibiting the interpretation of treaties to the "prejudice" of 
Indians "meant no more than that the language should be construed in accordance with the 
tenor of the treaty." Id. "We stop short of varying its terms to meet alleged injustices. Such 
generosity, if any may be called for in the relations between the United States and the 
Indians, is for the Congress." Id. In other words, "generosity toward Indians is for 
Congress, not the courts." State ex rel. Martinez v. Lewis, 861 P.2d 235,241 (N.M. 1993). 
As applied to water right claims, the Court cannot award water rights that conflict 
with the plain and unambiguous language of an act or agreement: signatory Indians are 
"bound by the plain import of the language of the act and the agreement," even if they later 
assert "that they did not so understand the act." United States v. Mille Lacs Band of Chippewa 
Indians, 229 U.S. 498, 507-08 (1913). Put another way, a tribe's "understanding [cannot] be 
imputed to Congress in the face of plain language" establishing congressional intent. 
Confederated Bands of Ute Indians v. United States, 330 U.S. 169, 179 (1947). 
An additional counterbalance to the canons of construction favoring Indian tribes is 
the fact that the implied-reservation-of-water doctrine is a judicially-crafted exception to the 
"history of congressional intent in the field of federal-state jurisdiction with respect to 
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allocation of water." United States v. New Mexico, 438 U.S. 696, 701-02 (1978). "Where 
Congress has expressly addressed the question of whether federal entities must abide by state 
water law, it has almost invariably deferred to the state law." Id. at 702. Exceptions to 
general rules establishing the respective boundaries of state and federal jurisdiction should be 
narrowly construed to avoid having the exception swallow the rule. Atkinson Trading Co. v. 
Shirlry, 532 U.S. 645, 655 (2001). "Because the reserved rights doctrine is an exception to 
Congress's explicit deference to state water law in other areas, the Supreme Court has 
emphasized the importance of the limitation of reserved water rights to only so much water 
as is essential to accomplish the purpose for which the land was reserved." Adair, 723 F.2d 
at 1419 ( citations omitted). 
a) Notions of equity or substantial justice are not relevant to determination of 
the water right claims before the Court. 
In determining the primary purpose of the Coeur d'Alene Reservation, the Court 
cannot employ any "notion of equity or general convenience, or substantial justice." United 
States v. Choctaw Nation, 179 U.S. 494, 532 (1900). Rather, the Court's role is to "find the 
intention of the parties by just rules of interpretation applied to the subject-matter; and, 
having found that ... follow it as far as it goes and to stop where that stops-whatever may 
be the imperfections or difficulties which it leaves behind." Id. at 533 ( quoting In re The 
Amiable Isabella, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat) 1, 71-72 (1821)). 
Because equitable concerns cannot be employed in determining the purpose of the 
Reservation, the Court cannot consider modern events in determining whether water rights 
were reserved in conjunction with the reservation oflands. Post-reservation actions are 
relevant only if they resulted in a loss of rights on particular lands or waterways, such as 
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occurred when the Reservation was opened to homesteading. See Act of June 21, 1906, 34 
Stat. at 335 ("lands not allotted or reserved [are] opened to settlement and entry"). 
The Tribe violates these fundamental principles of interpretation by urging the Court 
to consider its assertions regarding modern-day management of the Lake-including the 
unsupported allegation that the State of Idaho "walked away" from dealing with 
contamination issues-an allegation that the State denies. The Tribe's recitation of changed 
conditions in the Lake, the Tribe's lake management and education efforts, and the Tribe's 
continuation or resumption of traditional gathering activities and canoe building all have no 
relevance to the issue before the Court, which is limited to determining the primary purposes 
of the Reservation as mutually understood by Congress and the Tribe at the time the 
Reservation was permanently set aside. Thus, the Court should reject as irrelevant the 
evidence proffered by the Tribe relating to modern-day lake management, and restrict its 
consideration to the terms of the orders, agreements, and statutes setting aside or altering the 
Reservation and the historical facts relating to the negotiation and enactment of such 
documents. 
2. The Searching Examination Into the Reservation's Purpose Cannot Stop 
with the 1873 Executive Order. 
The United States and the Tribe both insist that the sole federal action that reserved 
water rights was the 1873 Executive Order, which withdrew certain lands from sale and set 
them apart as a reservation for the Coeur d'Alene Tribe. Ex. Order of Nov. 8, 1873 (1st 
Strack Aff. Ex. 3).4 Basing any implied-reservation-of-water claims exclusively on the 1873 
Executive Order, however, ignores both history and case law. 
4 First Affidavit of Steven W. Strack, filed Oct. 21, 2016, with exhibits 1-23. 
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First, the 1873 Executive order was intended to be a temporary withdrawal allowing 
time for Congress to act on a then-pending agreement with the Tribe. Hart Report at 136 
( executive order "was seen as a temporary measure to fully protect the agreement until the 
necessary legislation could be passed"); 1st. Strack Aff. Ex 2 (Letter of Nov. 4, 1873, from 
Commissioner of Indian Affairs requesting that reservation be set apart by executive order 
"pending the action of Congress upon said agreement"). 
Second, while Congress "recognized the existence of the 1873 reservation," Joint 
Statement of Facts ,r 64, it refused to ratify it without significant reductions to the amount of 
land and waterways included therein. An agreement negotiated with the Tribe in 1887 would 
have confirmed the 1873 Reservation, but: 
pressure to open up at least part of the reservation to the public (particularly 
the Lake), prompted the Senate to pass a resolution in 1888 inquiring of the 
Secretary of the Interior about the boundaries of the Tribe's reservation and 
"whether such area includes any portion, and if so, about how much of the 
navigable waters of Lake Coeur d'Alene, and of Coeur d'Alene and St.Joseph 
Rivers." 
United States v. Idaho, 210 F.3d at 1071 (quoting S. Misc. Doc. No. 36, 50th Cong, 1st Sess. 
(1888)). Subsequently, Congress directed the executive branch to enter into negotiations 
"for the purchase and release by said tribe of such portions of its reservation not agricultural 
and valuable chiefly for minerals and timber as such tribe shall consent to sell .... " Act of 
March 2, 1889, 25 Stat. 980, 1002. "The events surrounding the authorization clearly show 
that the main purpose of the new negotiations was to regain from the Tribe whatever 
submerged lands it was willing to sell." 210 F.3d at 1077 n.14. 
Congress' demand that the reservation be reduced prior to its permanent 
establishment, and its subsequent approval of the modified reservation, essentially 
superseded the earlier executive order and established the purposes for which the 
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Reservation would thereafter be managed, i.e., to "promote the progress, comfort, 
improvement, education, and civilization of said Coeur d'Alene Indians." Act of March 3, 
1891, 26 Stat. 989, 1028 and 1031. Congress' directive to reduce the Reservation by 
acquiring only non-agricultural lands further establishes that the primary purpose of the new 
reservation was to provide a base for the Tribe's ongoing and successful agricultural 
activities. 5 The Tribe was reported as being not only the best Indian farmers in the 
northwest, but as the "peers of any farmers on the Pacific slope" and "far advanced over 
their white neighbors"). Idaho's Statement of Additional Facts ,r,r 6-7. And, while the 
boundaries of the Reservation were "redrawn so as to ensure that the Tribe still had 
beneficial ownership of the southern third of the Lake as well as the portion of the St.Joe 
River within the 1873 reservation," United States v. Idaho, 210 F.3d at 1075, the exclusion of 
the Coeur d'Alene River and over 80% of the Lake demonstrates that reserving resources to 
support fishing and other subsistence activities was no longer a "primary purpose" for 
setting aside the Reservation permanently.6 
The primary purpose test requires a showing that the claimed use of water was 
"essential to the life of the Indian people." Colville Conftderated Tribes v. Walton, 647 F.2d 42, 
46 (9th Cir. 1981) (quoting Arizona v. California, 373 U.S. 546, 599 (1963)). By 1891, 
Congress had clearly concluded that the Tribe's essential needs were being provided through 
its agricultural endeavors, and thus Congress superseded the earlier executive order, which 
had been focused on providing resources for traditional subsistence, and established, in the 
1891 Act, a Reservation centered on the Tribe's needs for arable farmland. The Tribe itself 
5 See State ofldaho's Statement of Additional Facts ,r,r 1-12 (describing Tribe's agricultural 
activities). 
6 See Affidavit of David B. Shaw, iJ 12. 
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had emphasized its need for farmland several years earlier, when, in response to a rumored 
petition by white settlers to open arable reservation lands to settlement and remove the 
Tribe to lands east of the St Joe River, tribal leaders wrote: 
Are we squirrels or the like animals, thus to drive us into a wilderness, where 
nothing can be raised to support people? Or are we fishes, that we should be 
made to live in the water? We say that we are men, as well as any whites are. 
From the land they would take away, we get our food, our clothing & 
whatever we are in need of. For we till our land, raise crops, keep herds of 
cattle & thus provide for ourselves. 
Andrew Seltis and Eleven Other Coeur d'Alene Chiefs to JohnJ. Simms, U.S. Indian Agent, 
October 21, 1883 (3d Strack Aff. Ex. 25) (see also Smith 2015 Report at 84-85). 
In the Tribe's own words, their farmlands provided "whatever we are in need of." 
Thus, the Reservation established in the 1891 Act included only a small portion of the 
waterways that had previously been the focus of the Tribe's traditional subsistence activities. 
Such subsistence activities, which the Tribe (along with many white settlers) still engaged in 
when not busy with farm activities, were secondary to Congress' stated goals of promoting 
the "progress, comfort, improvement, education, and civilization of said Coeur d'Alene 
Indians." Act of March 3, 1891, 26 Stat. at 1028 and 1031. 
Even ignoring such history, as a matter of law a congressional act establishing a 
permanent reservation within the bounds of an earlier, executive order reservation, 
supersedes the earlier executive order. In British-American Oil Producing Co. v. Bd. of 
Equalization, 299 U.S. 159 (1936), the Supreme Court had to determine whether the 
reservation for the Blackfeet Indians was established by legislation or by executive order, 
because the mineral leasing laws for reservations established by congressional action were 
different and distinct from the mineral leasing laws applicable to executive order 
reservations. Id. at 161-62. The reservation occupied by the Blackfeet Indians was within 
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the boundaries of an earlier and larger Reservation that had been set aside by earlier statutes 
and executive orders for the use of the Gros Ventre, Piegan, Blood, Blackfeet, and River 
Crow Tribes. Then, in a congressionally ratified agreement: 
[M]uch of the earlier reservation was ceded to the United States, and three 
separate reservations, all within the limits of the earlier reservation, were 
created, one of these being set apart for the Blackfeet and the other two for 
the other Indians. By another agreement or convention, ratified by Congress 
June 10, 1896, c. 398, 29 Stat. 321, 353, which disclosed various considerations 
moving from the Indians to the government and the reverse, part of the 
separate Blackfeet reservation was ceded to the United States, and the 
remainder was set apart as the tribe's future reservation. This last reservation 
is the one with which we now are concerned. It rests entirely on the 
agreements or conventions which were ratified and given effect by Congress. 
The Executive Orders before mentioned, evidently designed to be temporru;y, 
have been superseded by congressional action and no longer are of any force. 
Id. at 162-63 (emphasis added). In other words, when Congress, by means of a cession 
agreement, establishes a permanent reservation within the bounds of an earlier executive 
order reservation, the reservation is thereafter founded solely and entirely on the 
congressionally-ratified agreement. 
The presence of superseding congressional action renders the intent of earlier 
executive orders irrelevant. This principle is amply demonstrated by the decision in Winters 
v. United States, 207 U.S. 564 (1908), which, like British-American Oil Producing Co. v. Bd. of 
Equalization, addressed one of the three reservations carved out of the earlier Gros Ventre, 
Piegan, Blood, Blackfeet, and River Crow Reservation by means of an 1888 cession 
agreement with the occupying tribes. Winters, 207 U.S. at 567-68 (discussing earlier 
reservation and 1888 agreement). 
In Winters, the Court acknowledged that the earlier reservation occupied by the Gros 
Ventre, Piegan, Blood, Blackfeet, and River Crow Tribe was "a very much larger tract which 
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the Indians had the right to occupy and use, and which was adequate for the habits and 
wants of a nomadic and uncivilized people." 207 U.S. at 576. But, the Court at no time 
suggested that the purposes of the earlier reservation were relevant to determining whether 
water rights had been impliedly reserved for the Fort Belknap Reservation. Rather, the 
Court found that the "case ... turns on the [cession] agreement of May, 1888, resulting in 
creation of the Fort Belknap Reservation." Id. It was the new reservation, and the 
accompanying "turnO to agriculture and the arts of civilization," that implied the need for 
water necessary to achieve such purposes. Id. 
In short, the Winters Court saw no need to examine the purposes of the earlier, more 
extensive reservation that was set aside to provide for traditional subsistence activities, 
because the later agreement, with its new-found focus on agriculture, superseded the earlier 
reservation. There is no reason to do otherwise here, where Congress explicitly refused to 
ratify the 1873 Reservation without substantial changes that excluded the majority of 
waterways used for traditional subsistence and prioritized reliance on agriculture. Given 
such history, the United States and the Tribe err in urging the Court to discard Winters by 
limiting the examination of the Reservation's purposes to the superseded 1873 Executive 
Order. 
The fact that the Supreme Court, in United States v. Idaho, examined the purposes of 
the 1873 Executive Order to determine whether submerged lands had been reserved does 
not alter the holding in British-American Oil Produdng Co. that subsequent congressional action 
supersedes earlier orders. In Idaho v. United States, the critical issue was whether the 
submerged lands at issue had been reserved for the Tribe's use on or before the date of 
Idaho's statehood on July 3, 1890. Absent a pre-statehood reservation, the lands would have 
passed to the State under the equal footing doctrine. Idaho v. United States, 533 U.S. 262, 272-
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73 (2001). Because Congress did not act to permanently set aside the Reservation until 1891, 
the only pre-statehood action reserving and setting aside lands was the 1873 Executive 
Order. Therefore, in order to determine the purposes of the Reservation as of July 3, 1890, 
the only relevant actions were the 1873 Executive Order, and the pre-statehood acts of 
Congress, which recognized the inclusion of navigable waterways in the 1873 Reservation by 
directing negotiations with the Tribe for the "negotiated consensual transfer" oflands and 
waterways., Id. at 281. 
Because the Court was limited to determining intent to reserve submerged lands on 
or before July 3, 1890, the Court never fully examined the purposes of the Act of March 3, 
1891, other than to note that the Act contained no cession by the Tribe of submerged lands 
within the boundaries of the diminished reservation established therein. Id. at 278. 
In short, while the purposes of the 1873 Executive Order were relevant to 
determining intent to reserve submerged lands in the reservation as it existed prior to 
statehood, nothing in Idaho v. United States suggests that the purposes of the 1873 Executive 
Order were not superseded when Congress established, in the 1891 Act, a new Reservation 
within the bounds of the Old, and set forth in explicit language the purposes and objectives 
for which the lands within the new Reservation would be employed. Thus, in determining 
whether intent to reserve water rights is implied by the purposes of the Reservation, it is the 
purposes of the "last reservation" that are controlling. 
3. There Is No Legal Basis for Implying the Reservation of Water for All 
Conceivable Uses Relating to Establishment of a "Homeland." 
The United States and the Tribe err by limiting their analysis of the Reservation's 
purposes to the superseded 1873 Executive Order, and then compound their error by 
asserting that the Court need only determine whether the Tribe and the United States 
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intended to establish a "homeland" for the Tribe. The assertion that water is reserved for all 
purposes necessary to establishment of a "homeland" is at odds with the very nature of the 
implied-reservation-of-water doctrine. "Because the doctrine is one of implication, the 
United States Supreme Court has traditionally applied it very narrowly." Potlatch Corp. v. 
United States, 134 Idaho 916, 926, 12 P.3d 1260, 1270 (2000) (Trout, J., concurring). 
The United States begins by asserting that the decision in Colville Coefederated Tribes v. 
Walton, 647 F.2d 42 (1981) recognized water rights for "homeland" purposes. Such 
assertion is wrong. U.S. Brief at 10. The Walton court observed that a "general purpose for 
the creation of an Indian reservation [is] providing a homeland for the survival and growth 
of the Indians and their way of life." Id. at 47. The court never suggested, however, that the 
general purpose of establishing a "homeland" was sufficient to imply the reservation of 
water rights. Rather, the court found such general purpose relevant only to the ability of the 
Tribe to use water reserved for one purpose for another purpose. Id. at 48-49. Tellingly, in 
determining the purposes for which water was reserved, the Walton court explicitly applied 
the holding in United States v. New Mexico, 438 U.S. 696, 702 (1978), and implied the 
reservation of water only for the "very purposes" of the reservation and not for secondary 
uses. Walton, 647 F.2d at 47. Thus, the Walton court implied a reserved water right only to 
"maintain [the tribe's] agrarian society" and to develop a small-scale fishery in a tribal lake to 
replace fishing grounds lost due to dam construction on the Columbia River. Id. at 47-48. 
Two years later, the Ninth Circuit reiterated that the "purpose of a federal reservation 
of land defines the scope and nature of impliedly reserved water rights." United States v. 
Adair, 723 F.2d 1394, 1419 (9th Cir.1983). In Adair, the court, again applying the primary 
purposes/ secondary uses test from New Mexico, id. at 1409, and without any mention of the 
"homeland" discussion in Walton, determined the primary purposes of the Klamath 
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Reservation by looking to the text of the treaty that set aside the lands: the treaty provided 
money "to promote the well-being of the Indians, advance them in civilization, and 
especially agriculture," but also expressly reserved all fisheries within the reservation for the 
exclusive use of the Tribe. Id. at 1409-10 (quoting 1864 IClamath Treaty, 16 Stat. at 708). 
From those treaty provisions, the court inferred that "both objectives [agriculture and 
"continuity of the Tribe's hunting and gathering lifestyle"] qualify as primary purposes of the 
1864 Treaty and accompanying reservation of land." Id. at 1409. 
The Adair decision establishes that if plain language in an agreement sets forth the 
primary purposes of an Indian reservation, the Court's inquiry is at an end. The United 
States, however, ignores Adair, and instead cites a number of lower court decisions in 
support of its assertion that water is, as a matter of law, broadly reserved for all "homeland" 
purposes. But, with one exception, the cases cited by the United States in support of its 
homeland theory do not, upon further examination, stand for the proposition that water is 
reserved for all uses associated with establishment of a "homeland." For example, the 
United States asserts that the Final Judgment in State ex rel. Rtynolds v. Lewis, Nos. 20294 and 
22600, (5th Judicial District, Chavez County, New Mexico,July 11, 1989), as affirmed by the 
New Mexico court of appeals, State ex rel. Martinez v. Lewis, 861 P.2d 235 (N.M. App. 1993), 
recognized reserved water rights "for recreation, agriculture, domestic, stock, commercial, 
industrial, and other uses for the 'arts of civilization"'). U.S. Brief. at 16. The United States 
fails to disclose, however, that at least some of the water uses recognized in the trial court's 
final judgment were the result of a stipulation among the parties, which expressly stated that 
"the plaintiffs do not agree to the legal basis of these claims." 3d Strack Aff. Ex. 26 
(Stipulation, State of New Mexico v. Lewis). As a result of the stipulation, the only reserved 
water right claims actually litigated were claims for irrigation. 861 P.2d at 238. 
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Because the lower court's recognition of reserved water rights for recreation and 
other purposes was the result of an agreement among the parties, it cannot be cited as 
precedent. See United States v. Walton (In re Baker), 693 F.2d 925, 925-26 (9th Cir.1982) (prior 
case did not establish controlling precedent since the question at issue was "simply assumed" 
by the parties and neither contested nor ruled upon); Rumsftld v. United Techs. Corp., 315 F.3d 
1361, 1373 n. 16 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (prior decision that merely accepted parties' agreement did 
not establish controlling precedent). 
Another case that the United States misrepresents as support for its "homeland" 
theory is Montana ex rel. Greely v. Confederated Salish & Kootenai Tribes, 712 P.2d 754 (l'vfont. 
1985). The United States asserts that "Greely supports a general homeland purpose by 
recognizing that the overall purpose of a reservation must be broad enough to encompass 
many different kinds of water uses ranging from agriculture to fishing and hunting." U.S. 
Brief at 14. The Greely court, however, did not have any reserved water right claims before 
it: the only issue it considered was whether "the Montana Water Use Act [is] adequate to 
adjudicate reserved water rights?" 712 P.2d at 762. In conjunction with such question, the 
court was merely surveying existing case law that described the potential scope of reserved 
water claims that could be presented in a future case. Id. at 762-65. Such dicta establishes 
no precedent. Montana Human Right., Div. v. City o[Billings, 649 P.2d 1283, 1287 (Mont. 1982) 
("[t]his Court is not bound to give precedential value to dicta"). And in fact, the court's 
dicta did not recognize reserved water for a broad range of uses: the court found authority 
only for a reserved water right to support agriculture and for fishing and hunting. 712 P.2d 
at 7 64. The court found no federal case law support for implying water rights to support 
industrial purposes or uses "classed as 'acts of civilization."' Id. at 765. 
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Likewise, the United States errs in citing the decision in State Dept. of Ecology v. Yakima 
&servation Irrig. Dist., 850 P.2d 1306 (Wash. 1993) ("Acquavella II") as support for 
"homeland" water rights. The United States' argument rests solely on a statement in the 
court's decision noting that the purpose of the reservation was to establish a "permanent 
settlement of the Yakima Indians." 850 P.2d at 1317. But in the Acquavella adjudication, the 
district court applied the New Mexico primary/ secondary purpose test, and ultimately 
concluded that the primary purposes of the Yakima Reservation were limited to agriculture 
and fishing, and thus claims "for commercial, industrial and other purposes are not and 
would not be in fulfillment of the primary purposes of the Treaty with the Y akimas." In the 
Matter of the Determination of the Rights to the Use of Surface Waters of the Yakima River Drainage 
Basin; Dept. of Ecology v. Acquavella, No. 77- 2- 01484- 5, Amended Partial Summary Judgment 
Entered as Final Judgment Pursuant to Civil Rule 54(6) at 7(Wash. Superior Ct., Nov. 29, 
1990) (3d Strack Aff. Ex. 27). On appeal, the Washington Supreme Court noted the lower 
court's holding that the Tribe would have to apply under state law to obtain water for 
"commercial, industrial, and other nonagricultural purposes," 850 P.2d at 1310, and only 
affirmed reserved water rights for the reservation's primary purposes of agriculture and 
fishing. Id. at 1316. Thus, if anything, the holdings in the Acquavella adjudication expressly 
reject "homeland" water rights. 
Given that neither Greely, Acquavella, nor State of New Mexico ex rel. &ynolds support the 
United States' claim of "homeland" water rights, the United States' claim rests solely on the 
decision in In re the General Adjudication of All Right to the Use of Water in the Gila River System, 35 
P.3d 68 (Ariz. 2001) (Gila River V). In Gila River V, the Arizona Supreme Court rejected the 
parties' proffered historical analyses of the reservation's purposes, instead holding, as a 
matter of law, "that the purpose of a federal Indian reservation is to serve as a 'permanent 
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home and abiding place' to the Native American people living there." Id. at 76 (quoting 
Winters, 207 U.S. at 565). In doing so, the Court rejected dicta from a prior decision stating 
that determination of purpose required "fact-intensive inquiries that must be made on a 
case-by-case basis," and replaced it with the court's legal finding "that Indian reservations 
were created as permanent homelands." Id. at 76 n.5 (citing In re the Genera/Adjudication ef All 
Right to the Use if Water in the Gila River System, 989 P.2d 739, 748 (Ariz. 1999)). 
The holding in Gila River V, however, rests on a series of false premises. First, the 
court concluded that because intent to reserve water rights is "merely imputed," rather than 
expressed, "its historical reality is irrelevant for purposes of establishing reserved rights." Id. 
at 75 (quoting Martha C. Franks, The Uses ef the Practicably Imgable Acreage Standard in the 
Quantification if Reserved Water Rights, 31 Nat. Res. J. 549, 563 (1991)). Ignoring historical 
evidence of intent, however, is completely at odds with the very foundations of the reserved 
water rights doctrine. As the Idaho Supreme Court has concluded, "[w]hether there has 
been a federal reservation of water, and the quantity of water reserved, are questions of 
legislative intent." Potlatch Corp. v. United States, 134 Idaho 912, 914, 12 P.3d 1256, 1258 
(2000). While intent to reserve water is rarely expressed explicitly, it can be inferred from 
the very purposes for which the reservation was established. Examination of the historical 
purposes of a reservation, therefore, is a critical element in applying the implied-reservation-
of-water doctrine and in ensuring "the limitation of such rights to only so much water as is 
essential to accomplish the purpose for which the land was reserved." Adair, 723 F.2d at 
1419. The Arizona court simply erred in discarding precedents calling for a historical 
examination into the purposes of each reservation. Cf Adair, 723 F.2d at 1409-10 ( engaging 
in historical analysis of treaty, negotiations, and related documents to determine the 
purposes "which the parties to the 1864 Treaty intended the I<Jamath Reservation to serve"). 
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The second false premise adopted by the Arizona court was its conclusion that the 
Supreme Court's admonition that reserved water rights must be "narrowly quantified to 
meet the original, primary purpose of the reservation" applies only to "non-Indian 
reservations." Gila River V, 35 P.3d at 73. To reach such a conclusion, the court had to 
distinguish the Supreme Court's decision in United States v. New Mexico, 438 U.S. 696 (1978), 
in which the Court held that "[e]ach time this Court has applied the 'implied-reservation-of-
water doctrine,' it has carefully examined both the asserted water right and the specific 
purposes for which the land was reserved, and concluded that without the water the 
purposes of the reservation would be entirely defeated." Id. at 700 ( emphasis added). The 
Supreme Court's reference to "each time" included its decisions addressing water rights for 
Indian reservations in Winters and Arizona v. California, 373 U.S. 456 (1963). New Mexico, 438 
U.S. at 700 n.4. 
Thus, the New Mexico Court clearly viewed the required "careful examination" of 
specific purposes as applying to all federal reservations, including Indian reservations. Such 
"careful examination" of an Indian reservation's purposes requires the court to determine 
the "very purposes for which a federal reservation was created," because while it is 
reasonable to imply the reservation of water rights for such primary purposes, "there arises 
the contrary inference" that Congress intended to acquire water under state laws "[w]here 
water is only valuable for a secondary use of the reservation." Id. at 702. 
The Supreme Court's limitation of reserved water rights to those necessary to fulfill 
the "specific purposes" of a reservation cannot be simply cast aside, as did the Arizona 
court. The term "specific" means "[e]xplicitly set forth, definite" and "[s]pecial, distinctive 
and unique." The American Heritage Dictionary ef the English Language 1669 ( 4th ed. 2000). 
Thus, in determining the purposes of a reservation, this Court must delve beyond the 
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simplistic assumption that all Indian reservations have a broad, general purpose of providing 
a home for the Indians, Gila River V, 835 P.3d at 7 6, and instead examine the terms of the 
agreements and acts of Congress that establish the definite and distinct purposes which the 
parties intended the reserved lands to serve. 
Third, and finally, the Gila River V court erred in crafting a "permanent homeland 
cortcept [that] allows for ... flexibility and practicality." 35 P.3d at 76. The court believed 
that flexibility in quantifying water rights was important because "an across-the-board 
application of PIA [had] potential for inequitable treatments of tribes based solely on 
geographical location." Id. at 78 (emphasis added). The court believed that such "inequity is 
unacceptable and inconsistent with the idea of a permanent homeland." Id. In interpreting 
treaties, however, a court cannot employ equitable considerations. United States v. Washington, 
157 F.3d 630, 650 (9th Cir. 1998). Thus, by interpreting the treaty establishing the 
reservation flexibly in order to avoid inequitable results, the Arizona court violated the 
Supreme Court's admonishment that courts are not "at liberty to dispense with any of the 
conditions or requirements of the treaty, or to take away any qualification or integral part of 
any stipulation, upon any notion of equity or general convenience, or substantial justice." 
United States v. Choctaw Nation, 179 U.S. 494, 533 (1900). 
In sum, the "homeland" theory propounded by the Arizona Supreme Court in Gila V 
is not well-founded, and should not be adopted by this Court. Intent to reserve water 
should be determined by engaging in an analysis of the purposes which the parties to the 
agreement establishing the current reservation "intended the ... Reservation] to serve"). 
Adair, 723 F.2d at 1410. Tellingly, the "homeland" theory has been soundly rejected by 
other courts. In Wyoming's Big Horn River Adjudication, the appellate court held that the 
"district court correctly found that the reference in Article 4 to "permanent homeland" does 
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nothing more than permanently set aside lands for the Indians; it does not define the 
purpose of the reservation." In re the Gen. Adjudication of Al! Rights to Use Water in the Big Hom 
River Sys., 753 P.2d 76, 97 (Wyo. 1988). 
Likewise, in United States v. Washington, 375 F. Supp. 2d 1050 (W. D. Wash. 2005), the 
United States claimed water rights for "homeland" purposes on the Lummi Indian 
Reservation "based on Gila River V." Id. at 1062. The United States claimed water rights 
"for all domestic, agricultural, community, commercial and industrial purposes," and 
contended that anything less "would unfairly limit the Lummi's water rights." Id. "The 
district court concluded that "[t]he effect of Plaintiffs position would be the quantification 
of a water right for a broad and almost unlimited range of activities." Id. Ultimately, the 
court concluded that the United States' assertion of a "homeland" purpose was "contrary to 
the 'primary purpose' doctrine under federal law" because it was "simply a formulation that 
does away with determining the purpose and begs the question of what water was reserved 
to make the 'homeland' livable." Id. at 1065 (quoting Washington's brief). The court 
concluded that "[t]he Court cannot find a 'homeland' primary purpose and end its inquiry 
... [tjhe appropriate inquiry under federal law requires a primary purpose determination 
based on the intent of the federal government at the time the reservation was established. 
These implied Winters rights are necessarily limited in nature." Id.7 
7 The court's decision was subsequently vacated pursuant to a settlement ag,-eement so that 
it had "no preclusive effect as to any party, any person or entity bound by this Order and 
Judgment." (U.S. ex rel. Lummi Indian Nation v. Washington, No. C0l-004 7Z, 2007 WL 4190400 
(W.D. Wash. Nov. 20, 2007)). The court did not repudiate its earlier decision, but merely 
"consent[ed] to vacate" it in deference to the parties' concern that its determination of priorities 
would be "at odds" with the settlement agreement, which "abandon[ed] the federal and state priority 
systems for allocation of water rights. U.S. ex rel. Lummi Indian Nation v. Washington, No. C01-0047Z, 
2007 WL 3273545 at *9 (W.D. Wash. Nov. 2, 2007). Thus, the court's initial decision remains, at 
the least, persuasive precedent for rejecting the United States' assertion that water is reserved for all 
"homeland" purposes. 
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a) Regardless of whether the Tribe's lands are labeled as a "reservation" or a 
"homeland," the primary purpose was to establish a home on which the 
Tribe could pursue its agricultural endeavors. 
The terms "homeland" and "reservation," as they relate to Indian tribes, are 
practically synonymous: the fact that a reservation was to serve as a tribe's "homeland" does 
not alleviate the Court's responsibility of determining the primary purposes for which the 
reservation or homeland was established. Here, as the State submitted in its Memorandum 
in Support of Summary Judgment, pages 44-45, a primary purpose of the Reservation was to 
establish a home on which the Tribe could pursue its agricultural endeavors, with an implied 
water right for irrigation if there are places of use on which the Tribe cannot earn a 
"moderate living" by raising basic grain or other crops without irrigation. The existence and 
extent of such lands, however, is an issue left to the quantification phase of this litigation. 
As for the United States' claims of water rights for domestic, commercial, municipal 
and industrial (DCMI) purposes, the State does not contest the reservation of water for 
domestic purposes and municipal uses within the current Reservation boundaries, but 
reserves the right, in the quantification phase of this litigation, to contest the number of 
wells and the amount to be diverted from each well that is necessary to meet the minimum 
domestic and municipal needs of the Tribe. 
For the reasons stated in the State's Memorandum in Support of Summary Judgment, 
pages 47-51, the State acknowledges that water was reserved for commercial and industrial 
purposes that have a nexus to the general agricultural purposes of the Reservation, but 
asserts that the following claims should be denied for the reason that the claimed purposes 
have no nexus to the primary purpose for which the Reservation was set aside; additionally, 
many of the claims are intended to primarily serve the needs of non-Indian visitors, not the 
Tribe. 
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CSRBA Claim No. 93-7462, Casino and Hotel Complex Well; 
CSRBA Claim No. 93-7463, Circling Raven Golf Course; 
CSRBA Claim No. 93-7464, Casino and Hotel Complex expansion; 
CSRBA Claim No. 93-7465, RV Park (future); 
CSRBA Claim No. 93-7466, Water Park (future); 
CSRBA Claim No. 95-16671, Golf Course (future); 
CSRBA Claim No. 95-16675, Golf Course Pond Maintenance (future); and 
CSRBA Claim No. 95-16669 (fish hatchery). 
The requirement that DCMI water rights have, at a minimum, a close nexus to the 
primary purpose of the Reservation is confirmed in the numerous court decisions either 
questioning whether DCMI water rights should ever be implied to exist or denying such 
claims outright. See Montana ex rel. Greely v. Confederated Salish & Kootenai Tribes of Flathead 
Reservation, 712 P.2d 754, 765 (Mont. 1985) (noting lack of "decisive federal cases on the 
extent of Indian water rights for uses classed as 'acts of civilization"'); Special Master' 
Report, Arizona v. California (Dec. 5, 1960) (1st. Strack Aff., Ex. 17 at 265) (denying water 
right claim for industrial purposes because the "reservations of water were made for the 
purpose of enabling the Indians to develop a viable agricultural economy"); State Dep'tof 
Ecology v. Yakima Reservation Img. Dist., 850 P.2d 1306. 1310 (Wash. 1993)(water right claims 
for "commercial, industrial and other nonagricultural purposes are not in fulfillment of the 
primary purposes of the [Yakima] treaty"). 8 Given such authorities, any decree of reserved 
water rights for DCMI uses should be limited to those claims that have an identifiable nexus 
to the primary purpose of promoting agricultural development, which clearly excludes the 
claims listed above. 
8 The State reserves the right to contest the quantification of the remaining DCMI claims, 
and further asserts that the place of use for such claims must be specifically limited to locations 
within the current boundaries of the Reservation. 
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4. The Alleged "Homeland" Purpose Does Not Support, and in Fact Is 
Counter to, the United States' Claims for Off-Reservation lnstream 
Flows. 
The United States relies on the alleged "homeland" purpose of the 1873 Executive 
Order as justification for its off-reservation instream flow claims. As noted previously, the 
1873 Executive Order was superseded by later legislation, but such issue aside, the assertion 
that the Executive Order reserved off-reservation water right is inconsistent with the 
assertion that the President intended to establish a "homeland" sufficient for all the Tribe's 
subsistence needs. If in fact the Reservation was intended to provide all the Tribe's needs, 
then there can be no implied reservation of rights outside the Reservation. The Court 
cannot rewrite history by implying an intent to reserve additional waterways outside the 
Reservation boundaries simply because modern science has determined that such waterways 
provide spawning areas for fish caught on the Lake. Such an assertion essentially argues that 
the Court should make an equitable adjustment of the Executive Order's terms to rectify the 
short-sightedness of the parties who established the 1873 boundaries. The Court, however, 
lacks such authority: courts cannot employ any "notion of equity or general convenience, or 
substantial justice" when interpreting documents setting aside Indian reservations. United 
States v. Choctaw Nation, 179 U.S. 494, 533 (1900). 
The United States then compounds its error by failing to explain how the alleged off-
reservation water rights could survive the subsequent cession, relinquishment, and quitclaim 
of all "right, title and claim" to all rights outside the current Reservation. Act of March 3, 
1891, 26 Stat. at 1027, 1030. By its own terms, the plain language of the cession includes not 
only the bare land, but all incidents of title and all appurtenant rights, including water rights. 
In reviewing an analogous assertion that hunting and fishing rights survived a tribe's 
cession of all "right, title and interest" to a portion of its reservation, the Supreme Court 
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emphasized that "even though legal ambiguities are resolved to the benefit of the Indians, 
courts cannot ignore plain langnage that, viewed in historical context and given a fair 
appraisal, clearly runs counter to a tribe's later claims." Oregon Dep't of Fish & Wildlife v. 
Klamath Indian Tribe, 473 U.S. 753, 774 (1985) (internal quotation marks and citations 
omitted); see also Confederated Bands of Ute Indians v. United States, 330 U.S. 169, 179-80 (1947) 
("[w]hile it has long been the rule that a treaty with Indians is to be construed so as to carry 
out the Government's obligations in accordance with the fair understanding of the Indians, 
we cannot, under the guise of interpretation ... rewrite congressional acts so as to make 
them mean something they obviously were not intended to mean"); DeCoteau v. Dist. Cty. 
Court, 420 U.S. 425,445 (1975) (tribe's agreement to "cede, sell, relinquish, and convey to the 
United States all their claim, right, title, and interest" in certain lands was "precisely suited" 
to convey "all of their interest" in such lands); id. at 447 ("[a] canon of construction is not a 
license to disregard clear expressions of tribal and congressional intent"); South Carolina v. 
Catawba Indian Tribe, Inc., 476 U.S. 498, 506 (1986) ("[t]he canon of construction regarding 
the resolution of ambiguities in favor of Indians, however, does not permit reliance on 
ambiguities that do not exist; nor does it permit disregard of the clearly expressed intent of 
Congress"). 
In short, there is no ambiguity in the cession language employed in the 1887 and 
1889 Agreements that would allow the Court to conclude that the Tribe retained any off-
reservation property rights~any right the Tribe may have originally had to restrict 
appropriation of streams and rivers in its aboriginal territory did not survive the Tribe's 
absolute and unconditional surrender of all off-reservation rights in the two agreements 
approved by Congress in the 1891 Act. See Menominee Indian Tribe of Wisconsin v. Thompson, 
161 F.3d 449,462 (7th Cir. 1998) ("the creation and acceptance of an Indian reservation by 
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treaty constitutes a relinquishment of aboriginal rights to lands outside the reservation ... 
including aboriginal rights in land or water not specifically mentioned in any treaty ... [i]t is 
irrelevant whether members of the Tribe continued to use these off-reservation resources"); 
United States v. Santa Fe Pa,: R Co., 314 U.S. 339, 357-58 (1941) (creation of reservation at 
tribe's request "and its acceptance by them amounted to a relinquishment of any tribal 
claims to lands which they might have had outside that reservation"). Rather than face such 
issues, the United States offers only the erroneous assertion that "[r]eserved water rights may 
extend beyond the boundary of an Indian reservation if such water is necessary to fulfill the 
purpose of the reservation." U.S. Brief at 46. Yet, not a single case cited by the United 
States supports its assertion. 
First, the United States asserts that the decree in Arizona v. California, 376 U.S. 340, 
344-45 (1964) awards irrigation water for the "irrigation of [Cocopah] Reservation lands 
from the Colorado River, which is located approximately two miles from the Reservation 
boundary." U.S. Brief at 46-47. The only authority cited by the United States is the U.S. v. 
Arizona decree, which does not identify the location of the Reservation relative to the 
Colorado River. And, as pointed out in the State's opening brief, the 1917 executive order 
establishing the Cocopah Reservation (Exec. Order of Sept. 27, 1917), in addition to 
reserving several tracts of land away from the Colorado River, also included "all vacant, 
unsurveyed and unappropriated public lands adjacent to [the withdrawn sections] and 
between the same and the waters of the Colorado River .... " Accordingly, the applicable 
Master Title Plat and Index Sheet (3d Strack Aff. Exs. 29 & 30) indicate that lands adjacent 
to the Colorado River were withdrawn by the executive order and became part of the 
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Cocopah Reservation, so that at least portions of the original executive order Reservation 
awarded water rights in Arizona v. California were adjacent to the River. 9 
The United States' citation of Kittitas fuclamation Dist. v. Sunnyside Vallry Irrig. Dist., 763 
F.2d 1032 (9th Cir. 1985), for recognition of off-reservation reserved water rights is 
especially inapposite. The Kittitas decision did not adjudicate any water rights. It simply 
upheld the authority of the district court under a 40 year-old consent decree to temporarily 
modify releases of water in order to protect 60 salmon redds that would have been exposed 
and destroyed if flows were lowered. The salmon had spawned on the upper portion of the 
river's beds due to "artificially high irrigation releases in the fall of 1980." Id. at 1033. The 
only issue before the Ninth Circuit was whether the district court had exceeded the scope of 
its jurisdiction under the consent decree in ordering the release of water and the 
transplantation of endangered redds to another location. Id. at 1035. 
In other words, the Kittitas decision addresses the equitable authority of the court to 
modify federal irrigation project operations to preserve fish, and associated treaty fishing 
rights, from irreparable injury-the Court specifically proclaimed that the underlying consent 
decree did not adjudicate the water rights of the Y akama Nation 10 and additionally clarified 
that "[w]e need not decide the scope of fishing rights reserved to the Yakima Nation under 
the 1855 treaty." Id. at 1034, 1035 n.5. Given those pronouncements, it is improper to cite 
the case as precedent for recognition of off-reservation reserved water rights. See Sethy v. 
9 As indicated on 3d Strack Aff. Ex. 29, additional lands were added to the Cocopah 
Reservation by Public Law 99-23, 99 Stat. 47 (1985), but the 1963 Arizona v. California decree only 
addressed water rights for the original Reservation as withdrawn by the 1917 executive order. 
10 In the mid 1990's the Yakima Nation renamed itself "Yakama" to reflect the 
pronunciation in the Nation's native tongue. Some of the decisions cited herein predate the change. 
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Alameda Cty. Water Dist., 545 F.2d 1157, 1159 (9th Cir. 1976) (en bane) (prior decision does 
not constitute "controlling precedent" if the "court did not reach the merits" of the issue). 
The United States especially errs by citing the unreported Washington district court 
decision in In the Matter of the Determination of the Rights to the Use of Suiface Waters of the Yakima 
River Drainage Basin; Dept. of Ecology v. Acquavella, No. 77- 2- 01484-5 (hereinafter 
"Acquavelld'), as precedent for off-reservation instream flows. While the district court did 
award the United States off-reservation reserved water rights to support the fishing rights of 
the Y akama Nation, the issue of whether such rights could be reserved was never litigated. 
The parties simply assumed such rights were reserved. 
The issue of off-reservation water rights arose upon motion of certain irrigation 
districts. The irrigation districts did not contest the authority or intent of the United States 
to reserve water rights outside the boundaries of the Y akama Reservation. Rather, their 
summary judgment motion was limited to arguing that whatever off-reservation water rights 
the Nation possessed had been extinguished or diminished by a series oflater federal 
actions. Acquavelfa, Memorandum Opinion re: Motions for Partial Summary Judgment at 46 (Wash. 
Superior Ct., May 29, 1990) (3d Strack Aff. Ex. 28). In other words, the only issue before 
the court was "the maximum quantity of water which may be claimed by the U.S. on behalf 
of the [Yakama Nation]." Id. at 3. The court ultimately decided that off-reservation water 
rights had been diminished but not extinguished. Id. at 60. 
When the summary judgment decision was appealed the Washington Supreme Court 
noted that: 
The question in this appeal is not whether the Indians have treaty rights to 
water from the Yakima River and its tributaries, but rather the quantity of 
water the Indians are entitled to and the priority date attaching to such 
quantity. 
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State Dept. of Ecology v. Yakima &servation Irrig. Dist., 850 P.2d 1306, 1309 (Wash. 1993). Later 
in the opinion, the court again noted that: 
All of the parties to this litigation agree that the Yakima Indians are entitled to 
water for irrigation purposes, and, at least at one time, were entitled to water 
for the preservation of fishing rights. The disagreement here is the extent of 
the treaty rights remaining. 
Id. at 1317. 
The Washington Supreme Court went on to confirm that the Nation's fishing rights, 
and the assumed water rights, had been "diminished" by later federal actions. Id. at 1331-32. 
On remand to the trial court, therefore, the issue was not whether the Nation had water 
rights for "usual and accustomed" fishing rights; the only issue decided was "which 
tributaries are diminished pursuant to the Partial Summary Judgment." Acquavella, 
J\lf.emorandum Opinion: Treaty &served Water Rights at Usual and Accustomed Fishing Places at 5 
(Exhibit 1 to Affidavit of Vanessa Boyd Willard)(emphasis in original). Likewise, the court's 
memorandum opinion addressing "flushing flows" did not determine the Yakama Nation's 
entitlement to off-reservation flows to aid migrating fish; rather, it implemented the partial 
summary judgment opinion in which the parties had assumed such entitlement. Acquave!la, 
Memorandum Opinion: I'tushing Flows at 2 (Exhibit 2 to Affidavit of Vanessa Boyd Willard). 
Because all parties in the Acquave!la litigation agreed that the Y akama Nation was 
entitled to water rights to support usual and accustomed fishing rights, the United States errs 
in citing the decision as precedent for recognizing off-reservation reserved water rights. See 
Webster v. Fall, 266 U.S. 507, 510 (1925) ("[g]uestions which merely lurk in the record, neither 
brought to the attention of the court nor ruled upon are not to be considered as having been 
so decided as to constitute precedents."); Berschauer/Phillips Const. Co. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 
881 P.2d 986, 991 (Wash. 1994) ("[i]n cases where a legal theory is not discussed in the 
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opinion, that case is not controlling on a future case where the legal theory is properly 
raised"); Sakamoto v. Duty Free Shoppers, Ltd., 764 F.2d 1285, 1288 ( 9th Cir. 1985)("unstated 
assumptions on non-litigated issues are not precedential holdings binding future decisions"). 
In sum, the United States has offered no justification, either in the plain language of 
the 1887 and 1889 Agreements, or in existing case law, for the reservation of instream flow 
fish habitat water rights outside the boundaries of the current Coeur d'Alene Reservation. 
Moreover, it is well established that when a tribe explicitly cedes all right, title and interest to 
lands, the tribe cannot claim that certain rights survived such cession by implication: any 
right the tribe retains must be reserved by language as explicit as that used to describe the 
cession. See Adair, 723 F.2d at 1418 n.31 ("[w]here the Tribe transfers land without 
reserving the right to hunt and fish on it, there is no longer any basis for a hunting and 
fishing water right"). That being the case, the Court must deny the Tribe's claims for off-
reservation fish habitat flows. 
5. The Alleged "Homeland" Purpose of the Reservation Does Not Imply the 
Reservation of Water for On-Reservation Subsistence, Cultural, and 
Religious Practices. 
The United States and the Tribe assert the alleged "homeland" purpose of the 1873 
Reservation implied the reservation of water to support on-reservation fish habitat. 
Instrearn flows for fish habitat are claimed for Hangman Creek, the St.Joe River, and all 
Reservation rivers and streams that drain into Coeur d'Alene Lake. See, e.g., CSRBA Claim 
No. 91-7777 (instrearn flow for fish habitat). Such claims would require that water use on 
large portions of the Reservation be restricted to ensure maintenance of the claimed flows. 
With the exception of Hangman Creek, most of the lands in the affected stream basins are 
lands opened to homesteading by the Act of June 21, 1906, 34 Stat. 325. Compare Hart 2015 
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Report at 334 (map illustrating tribal lands remaining after allotment) to Figure 3 of Dudley 
Reiser Report (showing stream basins) (maps attached as Addendums 3 & 4 hereto). 
Other claims to support traditional subsistence activities include claims to water 
rights at 24 springs in part to provide "wildlife and plant habitat for hunting and gathering 
rights" (e.g., CSRBA Claim No. 91-7779) and water rights for 195 wetlands for "wildlife and 
plant habitat" (e.g., CSRBA Claim No. 91-7782). The claim for lake level maintenance, 
CSRBA Claim No. 95-16704, is also based in part for fish and wildlife habitat. Hereafter, 
these categories of claims are described as "subsistence water rights." 
The United States and the Tribe purport to base their implied subsistence water 
rights on the 1873 Executive Order, which other courts have concluded expanded the 
original reservation "to include the Tribe's traditional fishing grounds." United States v. Idaho, 
95 F. Supp. 2d at 1106. Such argument, however, ignores the fact that: (1) unlike treaties 
interpreted to broadly reserve instream flows for fisheries, the 1873 Executive Order did not 
reserve an independent, "exclusive" fishing right; (2) the subsequent reduction of the 
Reservation in 1891 was paired with a provision dedicating the reduced Reservation to the 
promotion of "the progress, comfort, improvement, education, and civilization of said 
Coeur d'Alene Indians" (Act of March 3, 1891, 26 Stat. at 1027, 1031 ), without any 
provision preserving hunting and fishing against diminution due to surrounding white 
settlement; and (3) Congress later opened the majority of the Reservation to homesteading 
by non-Indians, and did not specifically reserve hunting, fishing, or gathering rights on 
homesteaded lands or on allotments later sold in fee simple to non-Indians. See Adair, 723 
F.2d at 1418 n.31 ("[w]here the Tribe transfers land without reserving the right to hunt and 
fish on it, there is no longer any basis for a hunting and fishing water right"). The above-
listed actions, both individually and in the aggregate, demonstrate that the exercise of 
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traditional subsistence practices was, at most, a secondary use, and not a primary purpose, of 
the Reservation. 
a) The claim that expansion of the Reservation in 1873 implies reservation 
of water to support subsistence activities ignores the fact that neither the 
Executive Order not any subsequent congressional act reserves the right 
to rely permanently on traditional subsistence activities. 
Neither the 1873 Executive Order nor the Act of March 3, 1891, reserve the right to 
hunt or fish as an independent property right to be thereafter held by the Tribe. Rather, the 
Tribe's ability to hunt and fish was limited to lands and waters that the Tribe owned and 
controlled-so long as the Tribe retained beneficial title to such lands and waters, it could 
use them for hunting, fishing, and gathering. But, as title was ceded or abrogated, so was the 
right to hunt, fish, and gather on the alienated lands. See, e.g., Oregon Dep't ofFish & Wildlife v. 
Klamath Indian Tribe, 473 U.S. 753, 768 (1985) (absent explicit reservation, no right to hunt or 
fish on ceded lands); Blake v. Arnett, 663 F.2d 906, (9th Cir. 1981) (absent explicit reservation 
of fishing right, no right to fish on alienated lands within reservation). 
As this Court has previously acknowledged, water rights for such traditional 
subsistence purposes, sometimes referred to as Indian reserved water rights, are in some 
respects fundamentally different than the typical Winters water rights, which are often 
implied by a change in circumstances that accompanies the establishment of an Indian 
reservation. SRBA 03-10022 Summary Judgment Order at 24-25. The existence of an 
Indian reserved water right "rests on the interpretation of the treaty so as to ascertain the 
intent of the parties," with the "foremost principle" being that rights originally held by tribes 
are retained unless ceded or extinguished. Id. at 24. "Extinguishment of Indian title based 
on aboriginal possession ... [can] be done by treaty, by the sword, by purchase, by the 
exercise of complete dominion adverse to the right of occupancy, or otherwise, [and] its 
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justness is not open to inquiry in the courts." United States v. Santa J<e Paczjic RR Co., 314 U.S. 
339,347 (1941). 
Notably, Indian reserved water rights, particularly on reservations later opened to 
homesteading and non-Indian occupation, have been affirmed only where the treaty creating 
the reservation explicitly reserved hunting, fishing or gathering rights and contained language 
that "confirmed the continued existence of these rights" despite subsequent changes in 
reservation land ownership. Adair, 723 F.2d at 1414. For example, in Adair, the treaty 
provided the tribe "the exclusive right to hunt, fish, and gather on its reservation," id. at 
1409, and such right survived the tribe's later loss of title, because congress explicitly 
provided that the sale of lands did not abrogate hunting, fishing, and water rights on the 
lands. Id. at 1409-12. Likewise, other cases recognizing Indian reserved water rights for 
subsistence purposes have based such rights on treaty provisions explicitly guaranteeing 
"exclusive" on-reservation fishing rights. See Joint Bd. of Control of Flathead, Mfrsion & Jocko 
Irrig. Districts v. United States, 832 F.2d 1127, 1131 (9th Cir. 1987) (suggesting that Flathead 
Tribe had a "colorable claim" to an Indian reserved water right based on treaty language 
reserving "exclusive right of taking fish" on reservation streams); State Dep't of Ecology v. 
Yakima Reservation Irrig. Dist., 850 P.2d 1306, 1315 (1993) (recognizing, pursuant to 
assumption of all parties, a continuing but diminished Indian reserved water right where 
treaty provided for exclusive right of taking fish within reservation); cf. In re the General 
Adjudication of All Rights to Use Water in the B~ Horn River System, 753 P.2d 76, 98 (JI/yo. 1988) 
(citing lack of treaty fishing right as supporting denial of tribe's claim of on-reservation 
instream flow water right for fish habitat). 11 Here, the two agreements creating the Coeur 
11 While the Ninth Circuit recognized reserved water rights for establishment of small-scale 
replacement fishing grounds in Walton, 64 7 F.2d at 48 and in Anderson, 736 F.2d at 1365, the court 
grounded such rights in Winters. The court specifically cited the changed circumstances caused by 
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d'Alene Reservation lack any reference to hunting, fishing, or gathering rights, exclusive or 
otherwise. In such instance, recognition of Indian reserved water rights for hunting, fishing 
and gathering would represent a significant and unwarranted expansion of the Indian 
reserved water rights doctrine. 12 
In short, nothing in the 1873 Executive Order, the 1887 Agreement, or the 1889 
Agreement allows the Court to conclude that the United States intended to "guarantee a 
predetermined amount of fish, establish a minimum amount of fish, or otherwise require 
maintenance of the status quo." SRBA 03-10022 Summary Judgment Order at 33 
(discussing off-reservation claims). Absent language establishing "an absolute right to a 
predetermined or consistent level of fish ... an implied water right is not necessary for the 
maintenance of the fishing right." Id. Here, nothing in the documents creating the 
Reservation guarantees the Tribe a given or even a sustainable harvest of fish, game, or plant 
material. Given the lack of such assurances, there is no basis for implying the reservation of 
a water right to support traditional subsistence practices. 
b) The claim of water rights for instream flows, springs, and wetlands for 
subsistence purposes is inconsistent with the primary purposes of the 
Reservation as established in 1891. 
Because the Tribe never bargained for an independent hunting or fishing right, it is 
limited to asserting that the expansion of the Reservation in 1873 to include lands and waters 
necessary to traditional subsistence activities implied the reservation of water to sustain those 
construction of dams blocking migration of fish to the Tribes' traditional fishing grounds that 
necessitated development of the "replacement" fisheries. The court did not suggest any right to 
water to maintain fishing rights as exercised by the Tribe prior to the dams' construction. 
12 See Atizona v. California, 373 U.S. 546 (1963), wherein the Court did not imply the 
reservation of water rights to sustain traditional hunting and fishing, despite acknowledging that 
water from the Colorado River was "essential to the life of the Indian people and the animals they 
hunted and the crops they raised," Id. at 599. 
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activities. Any implication that may have arisen from the Reservation's expansion in 1873, 
however, is negated by the subsequent cession of many of those same lands and waters in 
the agreement of September 9, 1889 (26 Stat. at 1029-32), the Agreement of February 7, 
1894 (approved in the Act of Aug. 15, 1894, 28 Stat. 286, 322), and especially the act 
opening the majority of the reservation to non-Indian homesteading (Act of June 21, 1906, 
34 Stat. at 335). "[T]reaty rights with respect to reservation lands must be read in light of the 
subsequent alienation of those lands." Montana v. United States, 450 U.S. 544, 561 (1981). It 
would make little sense to imply the reservation of water rights for a subsistence-based 
economy that relied on large tracts of lands and water when subsequent cessions of those 
same lands and waters made a subsistence-based economy impossible. See Hart 2015 Report 
at 288 ("[a]s a result of the [allotment] process Coeur d'Alene ownership of reservation lands 
was reduced from 345,000 acres to 58,000 acres [and] the Tribe lost all lakefront and 
riverfront property"). See Addendum, Map 2 (1911 map of allottments). 
It would make little sense to harken back to the 1873 Executive Order to imply intent 
to reserve water for subsistence purposes regardless of subsequent cessions when the parties, 
in establishing a permanent Reservation, did not themselves do so, but rather agreed that the 
purpose of the permanent Reservation was to engage in development that would "promote 
the progress ... improvement ... and civilization" of the Tribe. Act of March 3, 1891, 26 
Stat. at 1028, 1031.13 At the time the Reservation was permanently established, the terms 
"progress ... improvement ... and civilization" were widely used, by government officials 
and by the Tribe itself, to refer to the adoption of agricultural practices. When the 
Commission of Indian Affairs reported that the Tribe was "advanced in civilization," he 
11 CJ Adair, 723 F.2d at 1410 (basing purpose of reservation on similar provision to spend 
money paid to tribe to "promote the well-being of the Indians, advance them in civilization, and 
especially agriculture, and to secure their moral improvement and education"). 
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cited their extensive "cultivat[ion of] the soil" as support for such statement. Sen. Ex. Doc. 
14, A letter of the Secretary of the Interior relative to the purchase of a part of the Coeur d'Alene 
&servation, 51st Cong., 1st Sess. 4 (Dec. 18, 1889) (1st Strack Aff. Ex. 10)(emphasis added). 
The commissioners sent to negotiate the 1889 cession agreement with the Tribe described 
the Tribe's farms as evidence of the "great progress made by these Indians in the way of 
civilization." Id. at 6 (emphasis added). During the 1889 negotiations, Commissioner 
Simpson, noting "your broad acres now in cultivation," told the Tribe "[y]ou have 
progressed astonishingly." Id. at 8 (emphasis added). 
Likewise, during those same negotiations, tribal leaders requested additional 
compensation for tribal members who had "improved places" or "improvements" in the 
area to be ceded, and described such improvements as a "hay farm" near Fort Sherman, 
"that that is fenced," and as "farms" Id. at 11-12 ( emphasis added). And 17 years earlier, in 
a petition to the United States, tribal leaders noted that while they were, at the time, still 
dependent on hunting and fishing, they had "begun tilling the soil" and "though perhaps 
slowly we are continually progressing." United States v. Idaho, 95 F. Supp. 2d at 1103 (quoting 
petition of Nov. 18, 1872) (emphasis added). 
In sum, the historical record demonstrates that at the time Congress acted to create a 
permanent and reduced reservation, the terms used to describe the purposes of the 
Reservation, i.e, "progress ... improvement ... and civilization," would have been 
understood by the Tribe to refer to cultivated agriculture, and not to continued reliance on 
fishing and other traditional subsistence practices. Such plain language setting forth the 
primary purposes of the Reservation cannot be simply ignored by the Court, as would be 
required to imply the reservation of instream flows for fish habitat. Given the plain language 
in the 1891 Act establishing the purposes for which the lands were set aside, there is no legal 
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basis for concluding that the parties believed that preservation of fish habitat was essential to 
the Tribe's continued livelihood. Cf Arizona v. California, 373 U.S. 546, 599 (1963) (water 
right created by implication only if such use of the water was "essential to the life of the 
Indian people"); see also United States v. City of Challis, 133 Idaho 525, 529, 988 P.2d 1199, 
1203 (1999) (the "necessity of water must be so great that without the water the reservation 
would be entirely defeated"). 
i. There is no precedent for the decree of reserved water rights for 
cultural, spiritual, ceremonial, or religious uses. 
In addition to water rights claimed for traditional subsistence, the United States and 
the Tribe claim that water was reserved at springs and wetlands for "traditional, cultural, 
spiritual, ceremonial, and/or religious uses." See, e.g., CSRBA Claim No. 91-7779 (spring); 
CSRBA Claim No. 91-7782 (wetland). 
As discussed immediately above, the Reservation established in the 1891 Act was 
intended to promote the Tribe's agricultural endeavors, described in terms such as "progress 
... improvement ... and civilization." Act of March 3, 1891, 26 Stat. at 1028, 1031. 
Continuation of cultural, spiritual, ceremonial, and/ or religious practices was neither 
identified as a primary purpose of the Reservation, nor specifically reserved by the Tribe. 
Use of water for such practices was, given the Act's plain language, secondary to the 
purposes for which the reduced Reservation was permanently established. 
Indeed, the claims of water rights for cultural, spiritual, ceremonial, and/ or religious 
practices lacks legal support, as amply demonstrated in the United States' brief, which cites 
no court decisions in support of its claims of water from springs and wetlands for 
traditional, cultural, spiritual, ceremonial, and/ or religious uses. See U.S. Brief at 44-45. The 
Tribe, in its brief, offers no authority for, and does not even discuss, such purposes. 
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The sole court decision that appears to even address the reservation of water for such 
traditional uses is dicta from Gila River V, which states that "[w]ater uses that have particular 
cultural significance should be respected, where possible." 35 P.3d at 80. There is no 
indication that the court's dicta ever resulted in the award of water rights for cultural or 
religious purposes outside the context of a settlement agreement. Likewise, so far as the 
State has been able to determine, no other court has, absent agreement of the parties, 
recognized the reservation of water for the broad array of traditional or cultural uses claimed 
here. 
c) The fact that water uses for subsistence, cultural, and religious practices 
are non-consumptive is not a valid basis for decreeing such water rights 
for places of use on non-tribal lands. 
The United States asserts that its claims for consumptive use are limited to: (1) lands 
owned by the United States and held in trust for the Coeur d'Alene Tribe or an allottee; and 
(2) lands owned in fee by the Coeur d'Alene Tribe at the time that the claims were filed. 
U.S. Brief at 41. But, as the United States admits, its non-consumptive claims "include 
waters that cross private lands within the Reservation boundary." Id. The United States 
offers no authority for decreeing nonconsumptive or in situ reserved water rights on private 
land, other than to assert that it is "typical" for the State to hold such nonconsumptive water 
rights over private lands for the benefit of fisheries important to all persons. Id. The United 
States' assertion compares apples to oranges. The State may impose minimum stream flow 
requirements on waterways flowing over private lands as an exercise of the State's police 
power to regulate the diversion or withdrawal of water. See DeRDusse v. Higginson, 95 Idaho 
173, 182, 505 P.2d 321, 330 (1973) ("[t]he supervision by the state of withdrawal and use of 
water by and among the various claimants to its waters is an activity which is comprehended 
by the police power"). An Indian reserved water right, however, is not founded in federal or 
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tribal powers to regulate the use of natural resources on private lands, which powers, with 
limited exceptions, are generally lacking. See, e.g., Montana v. United States, 450 U.S. 544, 564-
65 (1981) (tribe had no power to regulate taking of wildlife on nonmember lands within 
reservation). Rather, a tribal non-consumptive water right is a form of property right-a fact 
demonstrated by repeated judicial holdings that reserved water rights must be appurtenant to 
reservations of federal land. See. e.g., United States v. City if Challis, 133 Idaho 525, 529, 988 
P.2d 1199, 1203 (1999) ("[a] reserved water right must be based on a reservation of land"). 
Because tribal reserved water rights are property rights, they cannot be retained by 
the Tribe on reservation lands opened to homesteading unless the Tribe expressly retained 
such property rights at the time the lands were transferred to non-Indian ownership. This 
facts is amply demonstrated by the series of Ninth Circuit cases addressing non-consumptive 
reserved water rights. 
In the first case, Colville Confederated Tribes v. Walton, the court addressed a unique 
factual situation: the tribe, cut off from its traditional fisheries on the Columbia River by the 
construction of federal dams, had developed a replacement fishery in a small, self-contained 
water basin on the reservation. The adult fish lived in a lake without outlet, and spawned in 
the single creek that fed the lake. Colville Confederated Tribes v. Walton, 460 F. Supp. 2d 1320, 
1324-25 (E.D. Wash. 1978). All of the lands in the basin had been allotted, and the tribe had 
acquired most of the allotments by acquisition or long-term lease. Id. at 1324. Three other 
allotments on the creek were owned by a non-Indian, Walton, who had purchased them 
from the original allottee. Id. The tribe had developed spawning grounds by re-routing the 
lower reach of the creek, which flowed through the allotments owned or controlled by the 
Tribe. Id. at 1325; 647 F.2d at 45 ("[t]he Indians cultivated No Name Creek's lower reach to 
establish spawning grounds"). 
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The court implied the reservation of instream flows to protect the fish habitat on the 
tribally-controlled allotments in the lower reach of the creek. 647 F.2d at 48. Nothing in the 
opinion indicates that the Tribe had any right to protect fish habitat in that portion of the 
creek flowing through Walton's allotment. Thus, the decision establishes nothing other than 
the unremarkable proposition that a Tribe may have a water right to protect fish habitat on 
lands that continue to be held in trust for the Tribe, a fact demonstrated by the court's note 
that "[w]e need not consider what effect the opening of reservation lands for entry and 
settlement had on the control of water on or appurtenant to such lands. All of the lands here 
involved were allotted." 647 F.2d at 53 n.16. 
In the second Ninth Circuit case, United States v. Adair, the court had the opportunity 
to address the circumstances under which water rights reserved for fish habitat could 
continue to exist on private lands which had formerly been reserved for a tribe. Adair 
addressed water rights on the "tenninated" I<lamath Reservation. Pursuant to since-
discarded policies, Congress terminated the I<lamath Reservation in 19 54 by acquiring the 
vast majority of property within the Reservation and taking steps to terminate federal 
supervision over tribal property and tribal members. See 68 Stat. 718 (I<lamath Termination 
Act). 
In conjunction with the termination provisions, Congress provided that the 
tennination of the reservation and sale of former reservation lands would not affect Article I 
of the I<lamath Tribe's 1864 Treaty, which provided the tribe "the exclusive right to hunt, 
fish and gather on their reservation." Adair, 723 F.2d at 1398; see also 68 Stat. at 722, § 14(b) 
("[n]othing in this Act shall abrogate any fishing rights or privileges of the tribe or the 
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members thereof enjoyed under Federal treaty"). 14 And, the termination act included a 
provision stating that "[n]othing in this Act shall abrogate any water rights of the tribe and 
its members." 68 Stat. at 722, § 14(a). 
Given the express reservation in the termination act of the treaty's "exclusive" 
hunting and fishing rights on private lands, and the express reservation of all water rights, 
the court concluded that non-consumptive instream flow water rights reserved in the 1864 
Treaty were not affected by the termination of the reservation. 723 F.2d at 1412. The court 
cautioned, however, that it would reach a different conclusion where land was opened to 
non-Indian ownership without an express reservation of hunting or fishing rights: it held 
that "[w]here the Tribe transfers land without reserving the right to hunt and fish on it, there 
is no longer any basis for a hunting and fishing water right." 723 F.2d at 1418 n. 31. Thus, 
Adair offers no support for the United States' claim that water rights to protect fish habitat 
continue to apply to waterways on reservation lands opened to non-Indian ownership with 
no express reservation of hunting and fishing rights. 
The final Ninth Circuit decision to address reserved water rights for fish habitat was 
United States v. Anderson, 591 F. Supp. 1 (E.D. Wash. 1982), affd in part, 736 F.2d 1358 (9th 
Cir. 1984), issued a year after the Adair decision. Anderson addressed water rights on a 
reservation opened to homesteading, and the court determined that reserved water rights 
were extinguished when opened lands were homesteaded: 
Winters rights were only intended to assist in accomplishing the needs of the 
reservation; where the land has been removed from the Tribe's possession and 
14 Article I of the 1864 Klamath Treaty provided that the Tribe would have "exclusive" 
fishing privileges within the reservation. Prior to Adair, the federal courts had interpreted Article I 
to include exclusive hunting and gathering privileges as well, Kimball v. Callahan, 493 F.2d 564, 566 
(9th Cir. 1974), and concluded that such rights likewise survived termination of the reservation. 
Kimball v. Callahan, 590 F.2d 768, 775 (9th Cir. 1979). 
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conveyed to a homesteader, the purposes for which W'inters rights were 
implied are eliminated. 
Anderson, 736 F.2d at 1363. The clear implication of the court's holding was that all implied 
water rights, including water right to support hunting and fishing, are extinguished when 
lands are homesteaded, a result in line with the holding in Adair that there would be no basis 
for a hunting and fishing water right on homesteaded lands without an express reservation 
of the underlying hunting and fishing rights. 
At the same time, the court recognized a reserved water right for fish habitat on the 
lower mile and one-half of Chamokane Creek, a non-navigable stream that bordered the 
reservation. 591 F. Supp. at 4. The court did not address ownership of the land over which 
the Creek flowed, but the boundary of the reservation, which lay west of the Creek, was 
drawn down the east bank of the Creek, so as to purposefully enclose the entirety of the 
Creek in the Reservation. Ex. Order of Jan. 18, 1881, 1 Charles J. Kappler, Indian Affairs: 
Laws and Treaties 925 (1904). Presumably, the bed of the creek remained under tribal 
ownership at the time of the Anderson decision, but regardless, no party appears to have 
asserted that the tribe's fishing rights or the claimed instream flow had been extinguished 
due to the openJng of the reservation. 
In sum, the decisions in Walton and Anderson are consistent with the holding in Adair 
that the transfer of land to private interests without an explicit reservation of hunting, 
fishing, or gathering rights extinguishes any basis for a reserved water right to support those 
traditional subsistence activities. 723 F.2d at 1418 n. 31. Here, when Congress opened the 
Coeur d'Alene Reservation to allotment and homesteading, there was no express reservation 
of hunting, fishing or gathering rights on private lands. When lands within a reservation are 
conveyed to non-members without an "express reservation or creation of fishing or hunting 
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rights" for the benefit of the tribe, the conveyance "grant[s] an unencumbered title" to the 
purchaser, "which would not be subject to any interest in the land that might be implied 
from the mere creation of the reservation." Blake v. Arnett, 663 F.2d 906, 911 (9th Cir. 
1981).15 Given that the Tribe has no right to hunt, fish, or gather on private lands within the 
Reservation, it likewise lacks any right to preserve and protect habitat for fish, game, and 
native flora on private lands-therefore, the United States' claims for fish habitat flows, 
springs, and wetlands, if not denied as inconsistent with the primary purposes of the 
Reservation, must be denied to the extent the place of use is on private lands. 
6. The Alleged "Homeland" Purpose does not Require that a "Natural 
Hydrograph" Be Maintained for Coeur d'Alene Lake. 
The United States claims it reserved water to maintain Coeur d'Alene Lake for 
purposes of "food; fiber; transportation; recreation; religious, cultural and ceremonial; fish 
and wildlife habitat; lake level and wetland maintenance; water storage; power generation; 
and aesthetics." CSRBA Claim No. 95-16704. Likewise, the United States claims a water 
right to the lower St.Joe River for fish habitat. CSRBA Claim No. 95-7777. In both 
instances the United States seeks a water right resembling the "natural" hydrograph of such 
water bodies as they existed prior to construction of Post Falls Dam. 
The State asserts that such claims should be denied for the reason that the claimed 
purposes are not, as discussed above, primary purposes of the Reservation. All of the 
purposes listed in Claim Nos. 95-16704 and 95-7777 were understood, at the time of the 
Reservation's permanent establishment in 1891, to be secondary to the primary purpose of 
ensuring a land base for the Tribe's then ongoing and highly successful agricultural 
15 For a more detailed discussion of how the holding in Blake v. Arnett applies to the Coeur 
d'Alene Reservation, see the State of Idaho's Memorandum in Support of Summary Judgment, 
pages 69-70 and 76-77. 
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endeavors. In addition, however, there are circumstances unique to the Lake and the lower 
St. Joe River that require the Court to deny the United States' claims of a right to maintain 
the natural hydrograph of those water bodies. 
The United States bases its claim, in part, on the fact that within the current 
boundaries of the Coeur d'Alene Reservation, the United States holds the beds and banks of 
Coeur d'Alene Lake and the lower St. Joe River in trust for the Tribe. The United States 
suggests that ownership of the beds and banks of a navigable waterway implies a property 
interest in the overlying waters. There is no support for such a proposition. If there were, 
then the State would automatically have a water right to all waters in navigable waterways. It 
does not. When the State determines it is in the public interest to maintain a certain lake 
level or stream flow in a navigable lake or stream, it, like every other water user, must apply 
for such water right and describe specifically the purpose of use and the amount of water 
that can be beneficially used for such purpose. 
Analogous principles apply to lake beds and river beds held by the United States for 
the Tribe's benefit. There is no automatic reservation of water rights simply because the bed 
of a water body is included in a federal reservation. For example, in United States v. New 
Mexico, 438 U.S. 696 (1978), the Court addressed whether the United States had reserved 
water rights in the Rio Mimbres, which "originates in the upper reaches of the Gila National 
Forest" before disappearing in a desert sink. Id. at 697. While the river was apparently non-
navigable and part of the forest reservation, the Court did not suggest that reservation of the 
land underlying the river in any way implied reservation of a water right in the river itself. 
Rather, water rights to the river were not reserved because such water rights were not 
necessary to achieve the primary purposes of the forest reservation. Id. at 708-12. 
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Likewise, in.Cappaert v. United States, 426 U.S. 128 (1976), the United States reserved a 
national monument which included the bed of an underground pool tbat served as habitat 
for an isolated fish population. The Court never suggested, however, that reservation of the 
bed of tbe water body implied reservation of all overlying waters as they existed at the date 
of reservation. Rather the Court examined the specific purposes of the overall reservation, 
and concluded that water was reserved only to tbe extent necessary to fulfill the purpose of 
the reservation. Even tben, the Court did not imply tbe reservation of water to cover all 
beds and banks of tbe pool. Rather, the Court allowed water in the pool to be appropriated 
for off-reservation development so long as a ledge tbat served as spawning habitat was 
protected. Id. at 141. 
And finally, in Adair, tbe court, addressing Indian reserved water rights, again made 
no suggestion that the mere inclusion of tbe Williamson River in the Reservation implied the 
reservation of the overlying waters-rather, its decision rested entitely on the fact that the 
Tribe had explicitly reserved to itself "exclusive" fishing rights on tbe River. 723 F.2d at 
1409. 
In short, New Mexico, Cappaert, and Adair demonstrate tbat inclusion of tbe beds of a 
water body in a reservation does not, by itself, imply reservation of all overlying waters. 
Regardless of whether title to beds and banks in a reservation resides in the United States or 
the State, tbe court must engage in a searching inquiry to determine the purposes of the 
reservation, and whether such purposes would be entitely defeated without water rights. 
Such inquiry is particularly relevant when addressing a claim founded in traditional or 
aboriginal subsistence practices-in such an event tbere must be language in tbe agreement 
or act establishing that "one of tbe 'very purposes of establishing the ... Reservation was to 
secure to the Tribe a continuation of its traditional hunting and fishing lifestyle." Adair, 723 
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F.2d at 1409. Here, the acts creating the reservation are plainly lacking any reference to 
hunting or fishing rights, and the claims for lake level and instream flow water rights to 
sustain such practices must be denied. 
a) The Federal Energy Regulatory Commission has already determined that 
maintenance of a natural lake level is not a primary purpose of the 
reservation. 
Water elevations on Coeur d'Alene Lake and the lower St Joe River are controlled by 
Post Falls Dam. Hart 2015 Report at 287. Washington Water Power Company (now Avista 
Corporation) acquired the site from Frederick Post in 1906 and constructed a hydroelectric 
facility. Id. Following hearings, the Department of Interior granted a permit to WWP in 
1912 allowing the company to overflow Reservation lands. Id. at 299-300. Today, use of 
Reservation lands for water storage by Avista Corporation is controlled by the terms of a 
license issued by the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC). Avista pays annual 
charges to the Tribe for storage of water over beds and banks held in trust for the Tribe. 
Order Issuing New License and Approving Annual Charges for the Use of &servation Lands, 127 FERC 
'i) 61,265, 'i) 62,163 Qune 18, 2009). The Post Falls Dam "controls water levels in the 
Spokane River and Coeur d'Alene Lake approximately six months a year starting in late June 
or July, after the spring runoff flows have peaked and largely subsided." 127 FERC at 
'i) 62,160. Water levels are held at or near 2128 feet above sea level "[t]hroughout the 
summer recreation season," then gradually released after Labor Day. Id. 
Here, the United States claims the right "to maintain the natural monthly Lake 
elevations and outflows" of Coeur d'Alene Lake, 16 and insists that the Tribe, being 
16 United States' Claims Cover Letter, frotn Vanessa Boyd Willard, United States 
Department of Justice, to Gary Spackman, Director, Idaho Department of Water Resources, dated 
January 30, 2014, p. 4 ("Cover Letter"). 
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"dependent on the Lake for subsistence, including hunting, fishing, and gathering ... in 
effect, bargained for the natural hydrograph of the Lake." U.S. Brief at 42-43. The water 
right claim, if implemented, would effectively prohibit development at Post Falls, because 
the claim requires a minimum outflow that is inconsistent with use of Coeur d'Alene Lake 
for water storage. CSRBA Claim No. 95-16704. The claim recognizes such fact by 
acknowledging that "the outflows will not be required during the effective period" of the 
"present licensed operations at Post Falls." CSRBA Claim No. 95-16704. Id. 17 
The purported purpose of the lake level claim is to prevent development of Coeur 
d'Alene Lake upon expiration of the current FERC license by restoring "the natural Lake 
processes [that existed] prior to Post Falls Dam." Claim No. 95-16704, § 10. Such purpose 
is inconsistent with subsequently-enacted general federal laws promoting hydropower 
development on Indian reservations. 
The Federal Power Act (FPA) was enacted "to provide for the ... development of 
water power [and] the use of the public lands in relation thereto." Fed. Power Comm'n v. Union 
Ele,: Co., 381 U.S. 90, 100 (1965) (quoting preamble to FPA, 41 Stat. 1063 (1920)). If the 
FERC determines that a water power development proposal is "best adapted to a 
comprehensive plan for improving or developing a waterway or waterways for the use or 
benefit of interstate or foreign commerce, for the improvement and utilization of water-
power development,[and] for the adequate protection, mitigation, and enhancement of fish 
17 The outflows claimed in Claim No. 95-16704 range from a low of974 cfs in September to 
a high of 23,000 cfs in May. The claimed flows conflict with the FERC license, which establishes 
summer outflows of 600 cfs, but if the elevation of the Lake decreases below 2,127.75 feet at any 
time between June 7 and the Tuesday following Labor Day, then outflows must be reduced to 500 
cfs "in order to maintain lake elevations for summer recreation .... " Project No. 254 5-115: Order 
Modifying and Approving Discharge Flow Monitoring Plan far the Post Falls Development, 131 FERC ,r 62246, 
64644 Gune 18, 2010). 
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and wildlife," then FERC may grant a license for such an operation, and authorize the use of 
"any part of the public lands and reservations of the United States." 16 U.S.C. §§ 797(e), 
803. The term "reservation" includes "tribal lands embraced within Indian reservations." 16 
U.S.C. § 796(2). If the water power development requires use of tribal lands, then FERC 
may issue the license "only after a finding by the Commission that the license will not 
interfere with or be inconsistent with the purpose for which such reservation was created 
" 16 U.S.C. § 797(e). 
Here, FERC has issued a license allowing modification of the natural hydrograph and 
storage of water in Coeur d'Alene Lake and the lower part of the St.Joe River. Order Issuing 
New License and Approving Annual Charges for the Use of&servation Lands, 127 FERC ,i 61,265 
(June 18, 2009). In order to issue the license, the FERC was required to find that the 
licensed operations are not "inconsistent with the purpose for which such reservation was 
created." 16 U.S.C. § 797(e). The FERC made such a finding for the Post Falls Dam, 
stating that the Tribe "raised no objection to the fact that the project reservoir, Coeur 
d'Alene Lake, occupies part of the reservation," and citing the lack of "any evidence that 
relicensing the Post Falls development as part of the Spokane River Project would adversely 
affect the reservation." Id. at il 62,169. 
FERC's finding that water storage on the Lake is not inconsistent with the purposes 
of the Reservation, and the Tribe's concession to that effect, undermine the claim that one 
of the very purposes of the Reservation was maintenance of "the natural Lake processes 
prior to Post Falls dam." CSRBA Claim No. 95-16704 § 10. If a primary purpose of the 
Reservation was maintenance of natural lake processes, the FERC would have been required 
to deny the license. 
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The United States and the Tribe were both parties to the FERC proceedings, and did 
not contest the determination that use of the Lake for water storage "will not interfere with 
or be inconsistent with the purpose for which such reservation was created .... " 127 FERC 
at ,i 62,169. Indeed, the fact that the United States and the Tribe request that any lake level 
water right be deferred for the term of the current 50-year FERC license demonstrates their 
continuing agreement with FERC's determination that fulfillment of the Reservation's 
purposes does not require that the natural hydrograph be maintained. That being the case, 
Claim No. 95-16704 must be denied. 
Likewise, the Court must deny Claim No. 91-7777, which seeks to establish a natural 
stream flow regime for that portion of the St.Joe River within the Reservation. The portion 
of the St.Joe River that lies within the Reservation is part of the project area inundated 
under the terms ofFERC License No. 2545-091. 127 FERC at ,i 62,158. The FERC's 
finding that inundation of the lower St.Joe River for hydropower storage is consistent with 
the purposes of the Reservation precludes the United States' claim that the purpose of the 
Reservation requires maintenance of the instream flows that existed prior to construction of 
Post Falls Dam. 
b). The United States' claim for lake level maintenance ignores the critical 
fact that Congress purposefully split the lake, retained only a small portion 
within the Reservation, and released the remainder from tribal control. 
The United States' lake level maintenance claim, which is based exclusively on 
"federal and tribal intent as it was understood in 1873" (CSRBA Claim No. 95-16704, § 10), 
ignores the subsequent exclusion of over 80% of the Lake from the Reservation in the 1889 
cession agreement, which re-drew the Reservation boundaries to purposefully bisect the 
STATE OF IDAHO'S .MEMORANDUM IN RESPONSE TO 
UNITED STATES' AND COEUR D'ALENE TRIBE'S 
JOINT MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGlvIBNT 49 
Lake.18 The United States' deliberate avoidance of the consequences of the exclusion of 
most of the Lake from the Reservation violates the Supreme Court's admonishment that 
"treaty rights with respect to reservation lands must be read in light of the subsequent 
alienation of those lands." Montana v. United States, 450 U.S. 544, 561 (1981). The United 
States cannot simply claim that a purpose of the 1873 Executive Order was to maintain the 
Lake's natural hydrograph without addressing the consequences of the subsequent bisection 
of the Lake. 
The bisection of the Lake was conclusively established by the federal litigation over 
lake ownership, including the district court decision (United States v. Idaho, 95 F. Supp. 2d 
1094 (D. Idaho 1998)), the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals' decision (United States v. Idaho, 
210 F.3d 1067 (2000)), and the Supreme Court's decision (Idaho v. United States, 533 U.S. 262 
(2001)). As both the United States and the Tribe assert, the parties to such litigation are 
"collaterally estopped and barred from challenging the findings of facts and conclusions of 
law" therein. Tribe's Brief at 4 n.2; U.S. Brief at 19 (arguing State is bound by factual 
findings not challenged on appeal). Indeed, the United States and the Tribe collectively cite 
over 120 factual findings and conclusions of law from the United States v. Idaho litigation that 
they assert must be adopted by this Court. 
In United States v. Idaho, all three courts found that the 1889 agreement purposefully 
bisected the Lake to exclude the northern portion of the Lake from the Reservation, and 
such findings were integral to the courts' decisions. After an exhaustive review of the 
historical facts, the district court found that Congress, "authoriz[ed] the Federal 
18 In the federal cases addressing ownership, the district court found that the "northern two-
thirds" of the Lake was excluded from the Reservation and the "southern one-third" was reserved 
for the Tribe. United States v. Idaho, 95 F. Supp. 2d at 1096. If one goes by length, approximately 
one-third of the Lake is within the current Reservation. By area, 15.5% to 18% of the Lake is within 
the current Reservation. Affidavit of David B. Shaw ,i,i 8 &12 (filed Oct. 21, 2015). 
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Government to negotiate with the Tribe for a release of the submerged lands," 95 F. Supp. 
2d at 1114, and concluded that: 
The resulting negotiations lead [sic] to an agreement in 1889, in which the 
Tribe ceded the approximate northern third of the 1873 reservation to the 
United States. The portion of the reservation subject to the 1889 cession 
included within its boundaries the approximate northern two-thirds of the 
Lake. 
Thus, the boundary line was drawn so as to bisect the Lake, with the northern 
two-thirds of Lake excluded from the reservation and the southern one-third 
of the Lake included within the new reservation boundaries. 
95 F. Supp. 2d at 1096, 1113. The Ninth Circuit also concluded that "the main purpose of 
the new [1889] negotiations was to regain from the Tribe whatever submerged lands it was 
willing to sell," 210 F.3d at 1077 n.14, and affirmed the district's court's findings regarding 
the subsequent bisection of the Lake: 
Following negotiations, the Tribe agreed to cede the approximate northern 
third of its 1873 reservation to the United States; this area included roughly 
the northern two-thirds of the Lake (the "1889 agreement"). 
The map submitted to Congress along with the written terms of the 
agreement showed the boundary of the reservation as bisecting the Lake from 
west to east at its southern third. 
As noted, the reservation's boundaries were redrawn by the 1889 agreement to 
split the lake-a fact recognized in the legal descriptions of the cession, the 
verbal explanation given to the Tribe and the maps submitted to Congress ... 
the natural reading of all available documents points to a purposeful division 
of the Lake. 
210 F.3d at 1071, 1075. The Supreme Court likewise concluded that in 1889, "the Tribe and 
Government negotiators reached a new agreement under which the Tribe would cede the 
northern portion of the reservation, including approximately two-thirds of Lake Coeur 
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d'Alene, in exchange for $500,000 ... [t]he new boundary line, like the old one, ran across 
the lake." 533 U.S. at 269-70. 
The courts' holdings regarding the bisection of the lake cannot be dismissed as mere 
dicta, for the courts relied on the Lake's bisection as significant evidence of federal intent to 
affirm tribal title to the Lake south of the bisection line. In the words of the district court, 
the bisection of the Lake was '"compelling evidence' that the United States intended for the 
Tribe to hold a beneficial interest in the submerged lands under the southern third of the 
Lake." 95 F. Supp. 2d at 1115. Likewise, the Ninth Circuit held that the "manner in which 
the boundaries of the reservation were determined" was relevant evidence of intent, and 
noted that: 
[S]ignificantly, when the 1873 boundaries were renegotiated in 1889, the 
"northern boundary line of the diminished reservation was drawn so as to 
bisect the Lake" specifically "for the purpose of establishing the Tribe's right 
to the Lake and rivers." 
As we recognized in another case in which we upheld tribal claims to 
submerged lands under the half of a lake within the borders of a reservation, 
"[i]t would have been pointless, and quite likely deceptive, to have the 
northern boundary of the reservation bisect Flathead Lake unless it was 
intended to convey title to the southern half of that lake to the Indians." 
Confederated Salish & Kootenai Tribes v. Namen, 665 F.2d 951, 962 (9th Cir.1982) . 
. . . This observation is equally pertinent here, where the natural reading of 
all available documentation points to a purposeful division of the Lake. 
210 F.3d at 1075. 
In short, the "purposeful division" of the Lake was a critical factual finding that the 
federal courts relied upon in determining intent to reserve the southern portion of the Lake's 
submerged lands for the Tribe. This factual finding was not challenged by either the Tribe 
or the United States on appeal. As the Tribe concedes, collateral estoppel applies to all 
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findings of fact made in the lake ownership litigation. Tribe's Brief at 4 n.2. For purposes 
of these summary judgment motions, the relevant fact is the federal court's finding that "the 
boundary line was drawn so as to bisect the Lake, with the northern two-thirds of [the] Lake 
excluded from the reservation." 95 F. Supp. 2d at 1113. This Court need not, and has no 
jurisdiction to, quiet title to submerged lands in the northern part of the Lake. But such a 
determination is not necessary here. Regardless of title to the underlying submerged lands, 
the Lake, north of the bisection line, was excluded from the Reservation. 
The United States ignores the fact that Congress sought "release of the submerged 
lands" from tribal control, 9 5 F. Supp. 2d at 1114, and asserts that the Tribe, nonetheless 
reserved to itself the right to determine water levels in the Lake based on its retention of less 
than one-fifth of its submerged lands. Moreover, the United States, by claiming the right to 
maintain outflows in the Spokane River below Post Falls, ignores the fact that the Tribe 
insisted that such section of the River be conveyed into the ownership and control of 
Frederick Post for the express purpose of allowing Post to use it "for water power and 
improvements." Act of March 3, 1891, 26 Stat. at 1031-32.19 
It surpasses reason to conclude that Congress intended to simultaneously release the 
vast majority of the Lake from tribal control while reserving tribal control over the Lake's 
water level. The irrationality of such a conclusion is further exacerbated by Congress' 
conveyance of Post Falls into private hands for the express purpose of erecting water power 
improvements. The plain language of the 1889 Agreement is unambiguous: 80% of the 
Lake was excluded from the Reservation, and control of the Lake's outlet, and the 
corresponding control over lake levels, was conveyed to Frederick Post, subject to applicable 
19 The fact that the Tribe expressly deeded Post Falls to Frederick Post to allow him to 
develop it for "water power" effectively disposes of the United States' claim of the right to maintain 
lake levels for water storage and power generation. 
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state and federal regulations-a fact confirmed by FERC's issuance of a license allowing use 
of tbe Lake for water storage, and its finding tbat such use is not inconsistent with the 
purposes of the Reservation. Given the bisection of the Lake, tbe express conveyance to 
Post, and the finding by an administrative agency of competent jurisdiction that water 
storage does not violate the purposes of the Reservation, this Court must deny the claimed 
right to maintenance of a "natural" flow regime on botb the Lake and the lower St.Joe 
River. 
c). Assuming, for purposes of argument only, that the United States Is entitled 
to maintenance of lake elevations, there is no requirement that such 
elevations be maintained by "natural" inflows and outflows. 
Claim No. 95-16704 asserts the right to maintain tbe elevation of Coeur d'Alene Lake 
at a specific level each month, ranging from a high of 2,129.6 feet elevation in May to a low 
of 2,120.4 feet in September. Such elevations, however, are combined with required 
outflows immediately below Post Falls dam, ranging from a high of 23,000 CFS in May to a 
low of 97 4 CFS in September. As a result, the specific water levels can be maintained only 
"so long as there is a sufficient flow into the Lake." CSRBA Claim No. 95-16704 § 10.a. In 
otber words, the specified outflows require correspondingly high inflows to maintain the 
lake levels requested in the claim. 
As the United States concedes, however, its claim for maintenance oflake level 
elevations is limited to the following place of use: "[t]hat portion of Lake Coeur d'Alene and 
its related waters that are located within the boundary of the Coeur d'Alene Reservation." 
CSRBA Claim No. 95-16704, § 5. Thus, by its terms, the rights asserted in CSRBA Claim 
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No. 95-16704 would be fulfilled so long as the lake elevations within the specified place of 
use remain at or above the levels specified in§ 8 of the Claim (Quantity Reserved). 20 
The implied-reservation-of-water doctrine has always been described as the right to 
that minimum quantity of water necessary to fulfill the purposes of a reservation. See Cappaert 
v. United States, 426 U.S. 128, 141 (1976) ("[t]he implied-reservation-of-water-rights doctrine, 
however, reserves only that amount of water necessary to fulfill the purpose of the 
reservation, no more"). No court has suggested that the doctrine includes a corresponding 
right to dictate how such a quantity is delivered to the place of use. 
Courts have rejected, moreover, any interpretation of the implied-reservation-of-
water doctrine that would require restoration of a waterway to a "natural," pre-dam 
condition. In Adair, the Ninth Circuit held that the Tribe's entitlement to an instream flow 
did not imply a right to "restoration of an 1864 level of water flow" or what the objectors 
called a "wilderness servitude." 723 F.2d at 1414. Rather the tribe was entitled only to a 
specific quantity of water necessary to support "its hunting and fishing rights as currently 
exercised." Id. And, in both United States v. Anderson and Colville Confederated Tribes v. Walton, 
the federal courts, addressing water rights for reservations where historic fishing grounds 
were destroyed by the construction of dams on the Columbia River, did not imply a right of 
restoration of natural stream processes. Rather, the courts implied the reservation of a 
quantity of water sufficient for development of small-scale "replacement fishing grounds." 
Anderson, 591 F. Supp. at 8, affd, 736 F.2d 42 (9th Cir. 1981); Walton, 47 F.2d at 48. 
In short, if the purpose of the Coeur d'Alene Reservation implies the need for a non-
consumptive water right, such purpose is fulfilled by providing a quantity of water at the 
'
0 The States reserves the right to challenge the claimed lake levels during the quantification 
phase of this litigation, if such is necessary. 
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place of use sufficient to meet the Tribe's needs as currently exercised, but does not require 
restoration of waterways to the condition existing at the time of reservation. Here, so long 
as the minimum quantify of water, expressed as a lake elevation, is present at the claimed 
place of use, the alleged purpose of the Reservation is fulfilled, regardless of the means used 
to deliver such quantity of water to the Tribe, and regardless of outflows in the Spokane 
River, more than twenty miles downstream from the claimed place of use on the 
Reservation. Whether the water level results from a combination of inflows and outflows, 
or whether the water level results from water backing up behind a dam constructed at Post 
Falls, the end quantity present at the place of use is the same. Therefore, in the unlikely 
event the Court determines that the Tribe is entitled to the maintenance of certain lake 
levels, the Court should deny the associated claim for instream outflows as measured in the 
Spokane River. By denying the claimed outflows, a water right for the Lake would, in the 
unlikely event of cessation of FERC licensed operations at Post Falls, leave open the 
possibility of fulfilling the claimed water right through other means that fulfill the claimed 
purpose of the water right, such as construction of a replacement dam that maintains water 
levels in the Lake at or above whatever levels may be established if the claim proceeds to 
quantification. 
Similar reasoning applies to Claim No. 91-7777, for instream flows on the lower St. 
Joe River. If water storage by the Post Falls project results in the physical presence of water 
in the St. Joe River, then the Tribe's interest in having water present at the place of use is 
fulfilled, regardless of whether such quantity of water is flowing through the place of use at 
the current rate or at the rate that existed before construction of Post Falls Dam. 
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V. CONCLUSION 
For the reasons stated here, the State of Idaho respectfully submits that the Court 
should deny the summary judgment motions of the United States and the Coeur d'Alene 
Tribe, and grant the summary judgment motion submitted by the State. 
Respectfully submitted this 2 ~day of February, 2017. 
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